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Executive Summary
Greater Toronto is recognized as a high-performing urban region. Over the past decade,
however, negative social, economic, and environmental trends have emerged that threaten
the region’s future. On the basis of documentary research and four focus group workshops
with a diverse array of professional practitioners, this paper assesses the Toronto region’s
current assets and vulnerabilities in relation to future risks. The discussion is framed by the
concept of resilience—an increasingly popular, yet abstract, concept in urban planning and
public administration. This paper proposes, first, that planning and policymaking be
directed toward increasing the region’s resilience, understood as the diversity and
redundancy of social, economic, environmental, and fiscal-governmental systems. Second,
it suggests that public resource allocation be guided by what some have called anticipatory
governance—the proactive use of scenarios to discover where multiple risks and
vulnerabilities intersect, and therefore where returns may be greatest. Finally, the paper
suggests that an appeal to improving quality of life rather than to crisis or individual selfinterest may be the most effective way to build broad support for long-term investments in
resilience-enhancing infrastructure and services.
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Introduction
The Toronto region is at a pivot point. There is a sense that it has arrived on the world
stage—that it is a high-performing and rapidly growing global city with an enviable
economic, social, and environmental record. Toronto routinely scores near the top of
international quality-of-life and business climate rankings. Over the past decade, however,
worrisome trends have emerged that may threaten the region’s future performance: rising
rates of poverty and socio-economic inequality, lagging innovation and productivity, a
growing infrastructure deficit, inadequate social and economic integration of new
Canadians, and concern about the adaptability of the region’s built and natural
environments to rising energy costs, climate change, and an ageing society. All of these and
more pose difficult and unresolved policy dilemmas for all levels of government.
It is in this context that the Project on Regional Resilience was initiated with
support from the Ontario Growth Secretariat and the Toronto chapter of the Urban Land
Institute to provide an integrated diagnosis of the challenges the region faces and spur
creative thinking on how best to respond to them. The investigation of the region’s
challenges, assets, and vulnerabilities synthesizes research by academics, governments, and
non-profit organizations with the findings of four thematic workshops with diverse groups
of professionals selected on the basis of their area of expertise. This project is not a
benchmarking exercise. It is not intended to systematically compare the performance of
the Toronto region to that of other regions. Indeed, there is no shortage of such city
ranking studies (see Taylor 2011). Rather, the intention is to develop a “within-case”
perspective on the region’s strengths, weaknesses, and threats.
The discussion is framed in terms of resilience. Resilience is a useful approach to
urban policy because it recognizes complexity, interconnectedness, and uncertainty, all of
which cloud the ability of planners and policymakers to anticipate, mitigate, or otherwise
respond to present and future challenges. Although resilience is an increasingly influential
concept in public policy and planning, it is often discussed in the abstract and there are
divergent perspectives on its practical application. In addition to exploring Toronto’s
current conditions and future potential, this paper also contributes to local and
international debates in planning and public policy by presenting a practice-oriented
model of urban resilience.
The paper places special emphasis on policymaking for the built and natural
environments for two reasons. First, the physical city, with its buildings, roads, rails, pipes,
wires, and open spaces, is the container for social and economic life. The construction of
the urban built and natural environment is a largely irreversible process. As its structure
shapes human behaviour—how we live, interact with others, move, work, and play—and,
ultimately, prosperity and quality of life, it is important that planners and policymakers
make the best possible decisions regarding its design. Second, the project was initiated in
the context of a now completed coordinated review of provincial land-use policies
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(Ontario 2015). To contribute to the review, a series of focus-group workshops with
expert practitioners was financially supported by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing with a Places to Grow Implementation Grant. An earlier draft of this paper was
presented to the Ministry as an input to the review.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 lays out a practiceoriented definition of resilience and how it can be applied in public policy for urban
regions. On the basis of the practitioner workshops and background research, Part 2 uses
the resilience framework to inventory the Toronto region’s assets and vulnerabilities in
relation to future challenges, with a particular focus on the built environment. Finally,
Part 3 draws on the workshop discussions to reflect on the political challenge of selling
resilience to a skeptical public. The paper concludes with a reflection on applying
resilience-oriented planning and policymaking in the Ontario context.

1. Governing for resilience
Governments, private-sector consultants, non-profit organizations, and academics have in
recent years embraced resilience as an organizing principle for urban policy and planning.
The term is used in different ways, however, so it is worth examining its meaning.

What is resilience?
The application of resilience to the urban and metropolitan contexts is a recent
phenomenon that has emerged from a variety of sources. In the natural and applied
sciences, resilience is conceptualized as a measurable intrinsic property of a substance or
system (see Holling 1996). Engineers have long studied the relative capacity of materials to
return to their original state after being exposed to stress. Biologists and ecologists have
examined how ecosystems maintain their essential functions despite disturbance.
Psychologists have studied the determinants of the capacity to respond to stress and trauma
of individual people and in particular children (Werner 1989). Social scientists’ application
of resilience is often more metaphorical. Economists and economic geographers have
studied the determinants of urban economies’ rapid recovery and growth in the context of
recession (Christopherson, Michie, and Tyler 2010; Pike, Dawley, and Tomaney 2010).
Similarly, resilience has emerged as a guiding concept in natural disaster preparedness.
There is some evidence of convergence among approaches. For example, socio-ecological
systems researchers have probed the interaction of human society and natural
environments, particularly in relation to climate change adaptation (Boyd and Folke 2012).
Urban resilience—the resilience of cities, broadly defined—is typically portrayed as
a property or capacity of urban economies, societies, and environments. For example, the
Urban Land Institute’s Urban Resilience Program, the Brookings Institution and the
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MacArthur Foundation’s Building Resilient Regions Network, the UN Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction, and the European Union’s TURAS project, among others, have used
resilience as a metaphor to explore the determinants of an urban region’s successful
response to predictable and unforeseen challenges. By understanding the determinants of
resilience, decision makers can assess and design policies to remedy gaps in preparedness.
The research varies, however, on how it characterizes the operation and outcomes of
1
resilience.
Three versions of resilience are visible in the literature.
1. Resilience as the capacity to bounce back to normal from external
shocks. The simplest definition of resilience is the capacity to “bounce back” to an
initial state after experiencing a traumatic event. In essence, resilient cities may
bend under stress but do not break, and come out much as they were before. In her
book The Resilience Dividend (2014), Rockefeller Foundation president Judith
Rodin defines resilience as the capacity to “prepare for disruptions, to recover from
shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (3). In this
vein, the Brookings Institution’s Metro Monitor project measures whether U.S.
metropolitan areas have returned to their pre-recession levels of total employment,
unemployment rates, economic output, and average house price (Friedhoff and
Kulkarni 2014). Focusing on natural disaster, the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives defines resilience as the ability to “absorb disturbances
while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning” (ICLEI n.d.).
Similarly, the Urban Land Institute defines resilience as “the ability to define and
plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events”
(McCormick and Marshall 2015: 2). The policy objective in this context is to
minimize the potential impact of a shock, such as a 100-year flood, by
“hardening,” or increasing the robustness of, infrastructure systems.
2. Resilience as the capacity to be positively transformed by shocks and
stresses. Resilience has also been defined as the capacity to transform, or “bounce
forward,” through crises, arriving at a new stable state that is different from before.
For example, a resilient urban economy may be restructured by recession, but attain
higher employment and labour market productivity in the medium to long term.
The policy objective in this case is to create incentives and transitional supports,
and make capital investments that encourage positive transformation. For example,
governments have encouraged the formation of higher-value-added manufacturing
activities by subsidizing training and skills development, creating tax incentives for
venture capital investment, and constructing new infrastructure.
1

For an comprehensive review of the urban resilience literature, see Meerow et al. (2016).
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These are typically described as “equilibrium” models. Both imply that there is stability
before and after the city experiences an external shock, and that resilience is a capacity that
determines how quickly it returns to its previous stable condition, or a new one.2 The
policy and governance challenge is to anticipate potential shocks and recover quickly
when they occur. A third conceptualization of resilience takes a different approach,
drawing from ecosystem theory to reject the notion of stable equilibrium altogether:
3. Resilience as a capacity to adapt to risks and uncertainty. Resilient cities
are complex adaptive systems that continuously adapt to changing conditions. Rather
than planning for or engineering an optimal future end-state, the governance
challenge is to accept uncertainty. Policymaking is a learning process of assessing
and managing risks, while remaining open to a range of possible futures (see Walker
and Salt 2012).
Understanding the city as an adaptive system means recognizing the interdependence of its
components. The functioning and performance of the economy, society, and built and
natural environments are connected in complex ways, and so change in one domain will
have expected and unexpected ripple effects in others. Managing risks requires an
appreciation of complexity and the potential for unanticipated consequences. It is in this
vein that we offer this definition of regional resilience:
A resilient urban region is one in which public and private authorities have the
capacity to strategically prepare for unexpected future risks while managing
avoidable ones. The governance challenge is to create institutions and make policies
that anticipate and adapt to both slow-moving and sudden changes, while
recognizing the complex interdependencies between a region’s social organization,
economy, built and natural environments, and governance.
Is resilience the same as sustainability?
Importantly, resilience is conceptually distinct from another buzzword, sustainability. In the
Brundtland Commission’s (1987) classic definition, “sustainable development … meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
Sustainability is therefore about the wise management of resources to keep things much as they
are. It is possible to be sustainable without being resilient, although in the context of resource
depletion and climate change it is often argued that sustainability is a prerequisite of resilience (see
Atmanagara et al. 2013; Newman, Beatley, and Boyer 2009; Newton and Doherty 2014).

2

Pendall et al. (2010) characterize these as the single-equilibrium, or “engineering” model, and the
multiple-equilibrium, or “ecological” model, respectively. Chandler (2014: 5–6) views the first two
“equilibrium” models as versions of what he calls “classical” resilience.
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Types of risk
Up to this point risk and uncertainty have been discussed in the abstract. If resilience is the
foundation of an urban region’s capacity to manage risks and cope with uncertainty, it is
necessary to sketch out what these might be. To do so, we must make distinctions between
sudden shocks and slow shifts, and also between internal and external sources of risk and
uncertainty.
Sudden shocks are discrete events that put stress on existing urban systems. These
may include extreme weather events, economic crisis, or the failure of critical
infrastructure. Slow shifts, by contrast, are slow moving or cumulative sources of stress.
These may include climate change, long-term economic restructuring processes,
demographic shifts, pollution, and the ageing of buildings and infrastructure.3 Sudden
shocks and slow shifts can be driven by internal or external processes. Internal risks and
sources of uncertainty are generated by the urban region’s characteristics, while external
4
risks come from outside. Table 1 lists examples of each permutation.
Chelleri et al. (2015) write that resilience-building necessarily engages multiple
spatial scales and time horizons because risks manifest at different speeds and over different
territories. Individuals, households, neighbourhoods and urban regions are subject to
transnational and even global economic and social forces as technological change increases
the connectedness of places and accelerated flows of capital, goods, and labour. This
perspective suggests that vulnerability increases at smaller scales. To be sure, local and
provincial policymakers have varying degrees of influence over each of these categories of
risk. They have no influence over large-scale external processes such as macroeconomic
shifts or climate change, although they may be able to anticipate and mitigate their impacts.
Provincial, regional, and local governments have more direct influence over internal
factors, such as the state of infrastructure and land use. Unlike capital, labour, and goods,
the built environment is immobile. It is this immobility that makes it both vulnerable to
external risks and the key to their mitigation.

3

The distinction between sudden shocks and slow shifts corresponds to Pendall et al.’s (2010: 80)
contrast between “acute shocks” and “chronic slow-burn” challenges.
4
The boundary between internal and external risks may be blurry. A communicable disease such as
measles, for example, is more likely to be imported from outside than originate locally, however its spread in
the local population is a function of internal factors, such as vaccination rates and population density. Also,
we must recognize that some sudden shocks are the cumulative effect of slow shifts. To cite some examples,
a housing shortage may be a product of demographic change, an extreme weather event or flood may be the
result of climate change, and a catastrophic bridge collapse may be the outcome of long-term
underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance.
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Table 1: Types of risk

Internal

Sudden shocks

Slow shifts

• Infrastructure failure

• Rising poverty and socio-economic
polarization, declining social mobility

• Epidemic
• Human-made disaster (e.g.,
industrial pollution event, train crash)
• Closure of a large employer
• Civil unrest (e.g., intergroup violence,
rioting)
External

• Natural disaster (e.g., earthquake)
• Extreme weather event (e.g.,
hurricane)

• Increasing traffic congestion
• Ageing infrastructure and building
stock
• Urbanization of rural land

• Macrodemographic change (e.g.,
ageing society, declining household
size)
• Changing societal norms and values

• Economic recession

• Changing volume and sources of
domestic and international migration

• Liquidity crisis
• National politics and policy (e.g.,
sudden changes in monetary policy,
interest rates, tax rates, fiscal
choices, immigration policy)

• Climate change (e.g., rising sea levels,
rising temperatures, drought)

• International politics and policy
(e.g., trade war, military action,
terrorist attack)

• Macroeconomic restructuring
(e.g., deindustrialization, shift to
service economy)

• Currency appreciation/devaluation
• Rapid change in energy prices

• Resource scarcity or depletion (e.g.,
fossil fuels, industrial commodity
inputs)

• Transformative technological
innovation

• Accumulation of pollutants in air,
water, land, plants, and animals

• Invasive species

Identifying risks is a necessary precursor to mitigating them, however this occurs in
an environment of temporal uncertainty. The future is to some extent unknowable. The more
distant the time horizon, the greater the uncertainty. Still, the cumulative nature or
potential “long tails” of decisions must be taken into account. Reflecting on his prior work
on the Greater Toronto Airport Authority’s long-term plan for Pearson Airport, workshop
participant Toby Lennox put it this way: “We didn’t know what would happen in 50 or
100 years. The one thing we did know is that if we didn’t get the first 20 years right, the
next 20 years wouldn’t really matter, because we’d be playing catch up anyway.”

Determinants of resilience
A review of recent academic and professional literature in economic geography, disaster
preparedness and recovery, international development, and urban and regional planning
shows that an urban region’s resilience is a product of its social, governmental, economic,
and physical characteristics. Consider the archetype of the sudden shock: the natural
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disaster. Rapid recovery requires an honest and competent public administration that can
maintain social order and allocate resources in times of crisis. Mitigation prior to the event
is equally important: the planning and construction of built environments and
infrastructure systems that minimize damage. Recovery is also aided by social cohesion:
networks and institutions outside of government that facilitate cooperation among
strangers. Campanella and Godschalk (2012), for example, compare two large-scale power
outages that occurred in New York City. In the 1965 blackout, which occurred in a time
of economic growth and optimism, “strangers aided one other in the streets and the city
was enveloped by a sense of collective goodwill and common purpose” (218). Twelve years
later, in a time of economic decline and social conflict, a second citywide blackout sparked
widespread looting and other lawlessness. Social cohesion, supported by prosperity,
mattered.
Table 2 lists commonly cited characteristics of socially, economically, and
environmentally resilient urban regions. As in the New York City example, these
characteristics are viewed as complementary. Cities with strong social capital; stable,
efficient, and honest public administration; a diversified economy; flexible labour markets;
and well-maintained infrastructure perform better in times of economic recession. Cities
with robust land-use and infrastructure planning and efficient public administration are
better prepared for, and respond more effectively to, natural disasters.
Many of these characteristics can be viewed as products of two factors: redundancy
and diversity. Redundancy is the notion that systems configured as networks are better able
to function under stress than those configured as hierarchies or chains. If one part of a
network fails, the load can be transferred to another part; if the weakest link in a chain
breaks, the failure is complete.
Diversity is also important. Drawing on his expertise in electricity production and
transmission networks, workshop participant Andrew Pietrewicz remarked that redundancy
without diversity accomplishes little, because duplicates of the same system component
will fail when subjected to the same stress: “Redundancy is a pillar of resilience,” he said.
“But it is only sensible when it is linked to diversity as well. There has to be a diversity of
options. Otherwise the one feature is simply twice as vulnerable.” For this reason, energy
planners seek to diversify energy sources to ensure consistent supply while creating
multiple redundant transmission lines to ensure that delivery can continue even if some
fail.
While this logic is often applied to physical distribution systems for networked
goods such as natural gas, water and sewer, wired and wireless communication, and
mobility systems, it also applies to administrative and decision-making structures. Resilient
public- and private-sector organizations are capable of efficiently foreseeing and making
sense of challenges and allocating resources to mitigate them (Sutcliffe and Christianson
2011). Without redundant and diverse capacities for decision-making, communication, and
implementation, institutions may be reactive rather than proactive and fail to learn from
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experience. Worse, they may be ineffective or even collapse in times of crisis (Sutcliffe and
Vogus 2003). In the workshop discussion, Aderonke Akande spoke about recent work
through the City of Toronto’s Tower Renewal program that aims to formalize some of the
structures of support that have emerged organically in some tower communities. During
the ice storm in the winter of 2014–2015, some communities experienced long power
outages. Building managers and tower residents set up stations with generators, provided
food, and checked on people who were isolated in their units while the elevators were
down. The City is drawing lessons from this community-level organizing to ensure that
the resilience those communities demonstrated during a time of crisis can be shared with
others, and built upon to minimize future risks and enhance people’s quality of life.
Table 2: Commonly cited characteristics of resilient cities

Social

• Social cohesion /
social capital
• Social mobility /
relative income
equality

Governmental/
Fiscal

• Political stability
• Rule of law
• Honest
government

• Access to
affordable housing

• Efficient public
administration

• Access to
education

• Redundant
communication
and emergency
response
capacities

• Access to social
supports and
health care

• Awareness of risks,
assets, and
vulnerabilities
• Integrated decision
making processes
• Fiscal capacity

Economic

Physical/
Environmental

• Locational
advantage (factor
endowments,
proximity to
markets)

• Advantageous
location

• Agglomeration
economies (city
size)

• Access to potable
water

• Diverse economic
base

• Robust long-term
land-use planning

• Skilled and
productive labour
force

• Adaptable land-use
patterns

• Proximity to
markets

• Food security

• Well-maintained
infrastructure
• Low energy costs
• Low transportation
congestion costs

• Flexibility (capacity
to dynamically
reallocate
resources)
• Broad public
participation

Redundancy and diversity are a hard sell in today’s political environment in which
public-sector efficiency is identified with the elimination of overlap and duplication and
the construction of “lean” processes and organizations. An alternative way of thinking
about redundancy and diversity is to shift the focus from costs to returns on investment. To
do so, we can borrow a concept from the financial world: the portfolio as a risk management
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tool. Investment portfolios are designed to minimize risk to future returns by diversifying
the financial instruments they contain. For example, much like a mutual fund, an
infrastructure network such as an electricity grid or transportation network can be thought
of as a portfolio of assets that is resilient to stress by virtue of its internal diversity and
redundancy.
Can resilience be measured?
Several think tanks and consultancies have developed or are developing quantitative indices of
resilience with the goal of comparing cities. The Rockefeller Foundation in partnership with Arup
International Development has developed a City Resilience Index that measures cities’ capacities to
respond to stresses and challenges (Arup 2014b, 2015). Similarly, London-based real estate firm
Grosvenor has published indices of city vulnerability and adaptive capacity that combine to form a
city resilience index score (Grosvenor 2014). The MacArthur Foundation and the Brookings
Institution supported the Building Resilient Regions project at the University of California at
Berkeley, which developed a Regional Capacity Index for all 361 American Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MacArthur Foundation n.d.; Weir et al. 2012). In each case, a composite index score is
calculated from a range of variables, some of which are derived from publicly available statistics,
and others from subjective assessments.
A related endeavour is the assessment by insurance companies of external risks to city-regional
economic output (Reguly 2013; Sundermann, Schelske, and Hausmann 2013). Lloyd’s City Risk
Index, which is based on analytic techniques developed at Cambridge University, calculates the
potential value of GDP that would be lost in 301 cities between 2015 and 2025 due to 18 humancaused and natural threats, including draught, extreme weather event, pandemic, cyber-attack,
earthquake, and nuclear accident (Lloyd's 2015).
Toronto and other Canadian cities score relatively well on these indices. Toronto and Vancouver
score first and second, respectively, in the Grosvenor city resilience index, which included 50 cities.
Due to its anemic recovery from the Great Recession, Toronto scored only 117th of 300 in Brookings’
2009–14 Global Metro Monitor—better than Vancouver (132nd) and Montreal (184th), and about the
same as Calgary (115th). Lloyd’s estimates that $16 billion, or 6%, of Toronto’s GDP is at risk to
disaster—similar to Boston and Atlanta, but considerably less than New York or London. According
to their model, market crash, cyber-attack, and pandemic are the three largest risks Toronto faces.
While these benchmarks may reveal variation over time and between cities, we suggest that the
greater promise of the resilience concept is to inform anticipatory policymaking.
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Anticipatory governance
Adopting a portfolio approach challenges policymakers and planners to rethink established
processes and practices. Traditionally, our approach has been to “predict and plan”: to
identify a preferred outcome or end-state and allocate resources to make it happen.5 As
Ahern (2011: 341) puts it, conventional planning has “tended toward a static conception—
where sustainability was envisioned as a durable, stable, sometimes formulaic ‘fail-safe’
urban form or condition that—once achieved—could persist for generations.”
One danger of working toward a singular future outcome is the failure to
anticipate unforeseen risks that may derail it (Hall 1980). Consider the example of Sydney,
Australia, which in the 1960s prepared a plan that allocated future population and physical
urban development under prevailing assumptions about average household size. Within a
decade, average household size had dramatically declined due to broad societal changes,
including the feminization of the workforce, availability of birth control, longer lifespans,
and so on. The result: while the population forecast proved accurate, mature suburban areas
were occupied at 80% of initial planned densities, with obvious implications for service
demand (Meyer 2003). Another case of faulty assumptions generating long-term
unintended consequences is that of Minneapolis–St. Paul, Minnesota, whose regional
planning agency in 1964 forecast a population of four million by 2000—1.3 million more
than what actually occurred (TCMPC 1964). The Twin Cities pursued highway system
expansion on this basis during the late 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the region’s
transportation infrastructure was oversized, consuming fiscal resources that might have
been allocated to other needs. By the time authorities in New South Wales and Minnesota
became aware of the gap between their forecasts and reality, considerable public and
private resources were committed and it was too late to redirect them.
An alternative approach to “predict and plan” is anticipatory governance or foresight
(Boyd et al. 2015; Quay 2010). Rather than identifying and working in a linear fashion
toward a predetermined end-state, anticipatory governance entails evaluating policies and
investments in terms of their compatibility with the widest range of potential futures. An
increasingly popular technique for assessing future risks and uncertainty is exploratory
scenario planning (Quay 2010; Roberts 2014; Tewdwr-Jones and Goddard 2014; Wihbey
2016). Instead of envisioning the most desirable outcome, projecting forward on the basis
of current trends, or forecasting the most probable scenario, exploratory scenario planning
entails the construction of worst-case, unacceptable, and acceptable scenarios. New York
City’s Panel on Climate Change, for example, devised multiple evidence-based scenarios
premised on different levels and rates of change in air temperature, annual precipitation, sea
5

Indeed, the foundations of the 2006 Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe are the visioning
by the 2002–03 Central Ontario Zone Smart Growth Panel and the population, housing, and employment
forecasts in the 2005 Growth Outlook prepared by Hemson Consulting. Similar processes of spatially
allocating forecast growth in line with a normative vision underlie regional plans in Vancouver, Calgary, and
almost every other growing city.
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level, and extreme hot and cold weather and precipitation events. These were then used to
“stress test” social and infrastructure systems. Those that performed the least well under
multiple scenarios are prioritized for investment. This logic could be taken further by
incorporating change in other variables, including labour market participation, energy
costs, housing costs, and so on. Similarly, the Great Lakes Futures Project employed
scenario analysis to assess the long-term impacts of eight social, economic, and
environmental drivers on the basin (Creed et al. 2016; Creed et al. 2015).
Accommodating uncertainty means devising policy frameworks, institutions,
physical environments, and infrastructure systems that can adapt, or continue to function,
under a range of possible future conditions. For example, we might ask whether Ontario
municipalities are facilitating the creation of new neighbourhoods, subdivisions, and
settlement areas whose urban form and supporting infrastructure will perform well for
their residents if energy costs dramatically increase, extreme weather events become more
frequent, the economic base changes, or the population’s demographic profile shifts. In the
workshop discussions, participants expressed concern that building adaptability and
flexibility into policy would translate into more frequent policy changes, undermining
investment certainty and driving up development costs. Policies and plans are quite
sensibly subject to mandatory periodic reviews that provide opportunities to reassess policy
objectives and instruments. Still, those with long-term financial investments in urban
development have a strong interest in reducing their exposure to risk and uncertainty,
including changes to the “rules of the game.” The approach to long-term urban planning
and policymaking presented here is expected to increase, rather than decrease, policy
stability by “pricing in” long-term risks and sources of uncertainty. A policy framework
that accommodates a range of possible futures will require less amendment over time
because it is designed to adapt to changing conditions.
Finally, policymaking through a resilience lens requires that planners recognize that
complex interdependencies are a source of uncertainty and that addressing them may have
unanticipated consequences or perverse impacts. Workshop participant Tom Smith advised
that policymakers and planners should adopt Hippocrates’ dictum to “do no harm.”

Summary
Resilience is a popular buzzword in urban planning and policymaking, particularly in the
fields of emergency management and climate change. Its meaning, however, is vague. We
define resilience not as a desirable end-state, but as a governing strategy for risk management
under considerable uncertainty. We distinguish between two types of risks: sudden shocks,
including extreme weather events or economic recession, and slow shifts such as
demographic change. These may be viewed as internal and external to the urban region.
Local authorities are likely to have more influence on internal sources of risk. Much as in
investment finance, the urban region should be viewed as portfolio of assets whose collective

15

redundancy and diversity contribute to its resilience. The goal of resilience-oriented
policymaking should be to foster these characteristics at a variety of scales and across
domains. The process of resilience-oriented policymaking is anticipatory governance: the use
of exploratory scenario analysis to determine which policy interventions will produce an
urban environment that will perform well under the maximum range of potential future
conditions. This is distinct from conventional “predict and plan” approaches, which identify
a singular desired future outcome and work toward creating it.
Whose resilience? Resilience for whom?
The concept of resilience has been criticized on several grounds. Social theorists have noted that a
basic condition of modern life is a “risk society,” one that simultaneously embraces and resists the
risks associated with rapid change (Beck 1992; Giddens 2002). In this context, some see the
emergence of resilience discourse as related to the contemporary atmosphere of heightened global
economic, social, and political turbulence and environmental threats, as well as a politicalideological context favourable to limited government, devolution of authority, and individual and
community self-reliance (Amin 2013; Beilin and Wilkinson 2015; Fainstein 2015; Shaw and
Maythorne 2011; Welsh). In connection with the latter, there may be a political tendency to use
resilience (in the sense of “bouncing back”) to defend a suboptimal or unjust status quo. Framing
urban resilience as a product of social capital or the strength of social bonds may also serve as a
cover for governments to “de-socialize” risks by privatizing or transferring welfare-state functions
to individuals or households. Moreover, Jabareen (2015) notes that control over the identification
and prioritization of risks, as well as the allocation of resources in response to them, is itself a
source of power. For this reason, most emphasize inclusive and collaborative urban governance
processes (Goldstein 2012).
Recognizing these criticisms, we propose that resilience is a potentially useful guide to
policymaking insofar as it foregrounds underappreciated sources of uncertainty and the complex
interconnections among social, economic, environmental, and fiscal variables.
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2. The Toronto region: risks, vulnerabilities, and actions
Mounting an anticipatory governance process for the Toronto region is beyond the scope
of this project. We saw an opportunity, however, to contribute to public debate on the
health and future of the region and, more specifically, to the Ontario government’s
coordinated review of its Toronto-region land-use planning policies by conducting a
holistic assessment of assets and vulnerabilities in relation to known risks. Toronto is
correctly hailed as a high-performing region, yet over the past two decades local
foundations, academic researchers, and others have independently catalogued a range of
negative indicators and trends.
This section synthesizes some these disparate findings with discussions that
emerged in four workshops held in February 2015 with financial support from the
Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Each workshop focused on a theme: the economy,
society, the built and natural environments, and fiscal health. Twenty-eight professionals
with experience in a broad range of issues were invited to participate (see Appendix).
Many of the participants came from outside the traditional constituencies of land-use
planning. In addition to planners, architects and urban designers, developer-builders, and
environmentalists, the roster of participants also included practitioners and experts in
social-service delivery, geriatric care, economic development, housing market and
demographic forecasting, fiscal policy, and the design and finance of infrastructure projects.
Workshop participants represented themselves, not their organizations or employers, and
their remarks presented in this paper are their own.
Each was asked to consider three questions:
1. What risks, threats, and uncertainties do the Toronto region face over the medium
and long terms?
2. What are the region’s principal assets and vulnerabilities that may improve or
undermine its capacity to anticipate and respond to these challenges?
3. And what interventions are required to improve this capacity?
Taken together, the workshops elicited a wide range of often provocative opinions
and arguments. They also revealed interesting, and sometimes surprising, connections and
points of consensus. At the same time, the discussion illustrated what one anthropologist
has called the Rashomon Effect, after the Japanese film in which different characters
interpret the same events in different ways (Heider 1988). The housing developer, the
economist, the social worker, the medical doctor, the environmentalist, and the public
finance expert are all centrally concerned with urban development and its impacts, yet
each understands it in different terms.
Much has occurred since the workshops were held. Most obviously, the 2015
federal election revealed a public appetite for broad-based infrastructure investment that
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was not foreseen by workshop participants. Debates over the causes of and solutions to
metropolitan housing affordability crises have intensified. And in the aftermath of the Paris
Conference on Climate Change, federal-provincial relations now revolve around the
linkage between climate change mitigation strategies and the future of Canada’s natural
resource economy. We acknowledge these and other changes and events in the discussion.

Assets
Toronto’s social sustainability and economic growth stem from a range of natural and
human-made assets. As Juan Gomez put it, “in this region we … have the right
fundamentals: education, transportation, infrastructure, openness to business, and the ability
to expand and attract workers who can find housing.”
Greater Toronto derives stability and
security from its location and natural endowments. Located near the border with the
United States means that Toronto is within one day’s drive or a short flight of
approximately one-third of the North American population. Southern Ontario also
benefits from being located far inland, yet with uninterrupted access to Atlantic sea routes
via the St. Lawrence Seaway. This gives Toronto a climate-change advantage—about 13%
of the world’s urban population lives in low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to rising sea
levels. The inundation of coastal areas will displace tens of millions of people and disrupt
economic production and trade (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). The Toronto region also
benefits from direct access to abundant fresh water, of which the Great Lakes account for
20% of the world’s supply. Finally, although the growing season is shorter than in the
American heartland, the food security of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, and Southern
Ontario more generally, is supported by abundant productive farmland.

Location, natural endowments, and proximity to markets.

In the workshop discussion, architect Martin
Sparrow, whose career has been primarily in Alberta, favourably compared Toronto’s
economic diversity to Calgary’s oil-driven boom-bust cycle. The Toronto region emerged
in the early postwar period as Canada’s preeminent manufacturing and service-sector hub,
supported by consistent investment in comprehensive infrastructure systems, including
highway, bus, and subway networks, and lake-based water and sewer systems, as well as
integrated industrial and business parks planning. This facilitated economic
diversification—while the region has large automotive, pharmaceutical, and financial
services sectors, it is not dependent on any one of them. By virtue of its sectoral diversity,
Toronto evaded the postwar economic decline of the nearby “rustbelt” cities of the Upper
Midwest and Northeastern states (King, Hracs, and Denstedt 2010: 1–4).
The Toronto region’s greatest assets may be its size and consistent growth. The
population of the Greater Golden Horseshoe has increased by an average of one million

Agglomeration, growth, and economic diversity.
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residents in each decade since 1950. The provincial government forecasts that this will
continue, fuelled almost entirely by international immigration. By 2040, the Greater
Golden Horseshoe is expected to have a population of 13.4 million, up from 7.8 million in
2000. About three-quarters of this growth is forecast to occur in the Greater Toronto and
Hamilton Area (GTHA). This translates into national “heft.” The Greater Toronto Area
(not including the outer ring of the Greater Golden Horseshoe) accounts for 20% of
Canada’s GDP, and 45% of Ontario’s.
Population increase is an asset in and of itself because it grows the economic and
fiscal pie: new residents are also new workers and taxpayers. Economists have shown that
economic growth correlates with both sectoral diversity and the agglomeration of
population and businesses—in essence, that growth begets growth (see Glaeser 2010;
Krugman 1991; Wolfe 2014). As Matthias Sweet noted, “The single biggest asset that the
Toronto Region has is a large labour pool. And this large labour pool gives us this capacity
for people to find their optimal jobs and for employers to find their optimal labour.” In
short, Toronto’s agglomeration enables it to be diverse and specialized at the same time—
the very definition of a redundant and diverse portfolio of economic assets.
Political stability, tolerance, and diversity. Toronto’s

growth has been sustained by its relative
stability. Canada is recognized as possessing exceptional political stability and low crime
rates even compared to other developed countries. (Indeed, Canadian cities’ high rankings
in the Grosvenor Resilience Index and other business climate and quality-of-life indices
stem in large part from domestic political stability, lack of corruption, and rule of law.)
Toronto’s stability and tolerance make it attractive to migrants and international
investors. In fact, diverse international migration has driven the region’s economic
agglomeration and diversification. A societal consensus in favour of large-scale immigration
sets Canada apart from most other democratic countries. Indeed, Canada may be the only
immigrant-receiving country without a mainstream anti-immigration political party. While
accepting approximately 100,000 international migrants per year and becoming one of the
most ethno-linguistically diverse cities in the world, the Toronto region has experienced
little of the large-scale social and political conflict or civil unrest seen in other cities.
Evidence is accumulating that Canadian urban housing markets—principally Vancouver’s
but also Toronto’s—have become safe places for international investors to park capital at a
time when returns are low and a weak Canadian dollar reduces costs to external buyers
(Canada 2016; Duggan 2016; Ireland 2015).Toronto’s historical capacity to receive and
integrate international migrants is facilitated by its existing diasporic communities. As Peter
Thoma put it, “people looking for where to go in the world will start with their own
personal networks, and those networks exist in Toronto.”
Some workshop participants proposed that Toronto may benefit from problems
elsewhere in the world, including population displacement due to war, inter-group
conflict, natural disaster, climate change, and economic and political uncertainty. Indeed,
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the World Bank (2016) has made several dire forecasts: that water scarcity alone may
reduce GDP in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia by as much as 14% by 2050; rising
prices for food and clean water will blunt global poverty reduction; and draught and
natural disaster will spark resource-driven armed conflicts. Toby Lennox argued that
Toronto should market its stability to global corporations who may be looking to shift
production and supply chains to locations less susceptible to long-term risks, including
political instability and climate change.
Collectively, Canadian governments have
considerably more spending and borrowing capacity than they did 20 years ago, the latter
enhanced by historically low interest rates. Total government spending nationwide
decreased to 39% of GDP in 2014 from 53% in 1992. The total government debt-to-GDP
ratio (again, all levels) declined from over 100% to about 66% in 2007 as the federal and
many provincial governments brought their budgets into balance in the late 1990s and
2000s through a mix of expenditure reductions and tax increases (Crowley, Murphy, and
Veldhuis 2012). Nationally, stimulus measures drove the total government debt-to-GDP
ratio up to 86% in 2014. Despite this uptick, the debt burden is considerably less than in
similar economies. Overall, the municipal fiscal balance sheet is healthy. Municipal
governments are forbidden to run operating deficits, and collectively have plenty of room
to borrow for capital projects (Bazel and Mintz 2014). The City of Toronto has voluntarily
elected to cap its debt servicing costs well below the province’s limit of one-quarter of the
operating budget. Canadian governments’ fiscal prudence relative to many other countries
means that resources are available to pursue resilience-enhancing social, economic, and
environmental policy objectives.

Relative prudence in a favourable fiscal environment.

External risks
Macro-demographic risk: The ageing society. Last

year was the first in which the total number
of Canadian seniors exceeded people under the age of 15. The long-term decline in birth
rates coupled with longer lifespans means that the average age of the population is
increasing while labour market participation rates are declining (Ontario 2014: ch. 1). The
Ontario government forecasts that, province-wide, the number of seniors will double in
absolute terms by 2035. This will have a variety of interdependent effects.
A growing over-65 population will spur greater demand for senior-appropriate
housing and neighbourhood environments. In the United States, seniors have eclipsed
young people as the principal driver of household formation (Kolko 2015). With
advancing age comes reduced mobility and increased incidence of disease and disability, all
of which undermine the confidence and capacity to live independently (Frye 2014; WHO
2007). Neighbourhood-scale barriers to mobility, such as wheelchair-inaccessible
pedestrian environments and buildings, pose a profound barrier to independent ageing in
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place. Legislated requirements, including under the 2005 Accessibility for Ontarians with
Disabilities Act, pertain to new construction, but the retrofitting of existing neighbourhoods
is often impracticable.
The social isolation of older people will only grow in the coming decades. Samir
Sinha noted that “we’re less likely now than 50 years ago to live in intergenerational
households or even intergenerational communities. In fact, 23% of older Ontarians tell us
that they don’t have anyone close by who can help them with a simple task if needed. That
level of social isolation is a big concern.” As people continue to age in place in
neighbourhoods that are single-use and car-dependent, the risks associated with social
isolation will grow, including increased emergency response needs and health care costs.
A higher dependency ratio (the proportion of young and elderly dependents to
income-earners) will put pressure on the tax base. More people on fixed incomes, a
substantial proportion of which will be in the form of transfers from governments,
translates into higher spending demands and less tax revenue. At the same time, the
growing cohort of seniors will generate new demands for health and long-term care
expenditures. Governments will also be expected to pay out pension and other benefits to
a growing number of former employees. Demographically driven revenue constraints and
cost pressures will occur in addition to demands for new spending on growth-related
infrastructure and the maintenance and replacement of existing systems. In Greater
Toronto, the trend toward an ageing society will be somewhat moderated by immigration,
which brings working-age people and youth into the economy.
Changes to weather and air and water temperatures pose
another category of risk. The increasing frequency of sudden shocks such as extreme
weather events, as well as slow shifts such as increasing seasonal temperature variation, will
impose direct and indirect costs on households and businesses, especially in cities (Hunt
and Watkiss 2011). Floods as a result of high-volume precipitation will stress storm water
management infrastructure and increase soil erosion, resulting in increased property
damage. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that $US4.2 trillion of economic value
would be at risk globally through the year 2100, should the average temperature rise by
4ºC (EIU 2015). Climate-change risks may be anticipated and mitigated, although their
precise timing and severity of impact may not be predictable. Insurance companies are
already pricing climate change risks into their models (Sundermann, Schelske, and
Hausmann 2014; Team Green Analytics 2015).
By the 2040s, the average temperature in the Toronto region is expected to rise by
3.5 to 4ºC, increasing with distance from Lake Ontario (Theobald et al. 2011). The
University of Hawaii’s Mora Lab projects that in the absence of global mitigation of
carbon emissions, Toronto will reach “climate departure”—the year after which the
average temperature will exceed the extreme high between 1860 and 2005—in 2047
(Mora 2013). The Toronto Environmental Office and Toronto Public Health forecast that

Environmental risk: Climate change.
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the number of days with extreme heat (over 30ºC) will triple and that the number of
annual heat-related deaths could double by mid-century (City of Toronto 2014b). Analysis
indicates that air temperatures are highest in high-density areas featuring more
impermeable surfaces, which indicates the need to integrate heat mitigation into new and
redeveloped built environments (Rinner and Hussain 2011). As temperatures rise, a greater
proportion of precipitation will fall as rain rather than snow. There is likely to be
considerably less snow in the winter, but precipitation will also be more concentrated,
falling in short, high-volume bursts that will challenge existing stormwater infrastructure
and run off rather than be absorbed into soil (Theobald et al. 2011).
Globally, fresh water is under stress due to climate change and urban development
(UN Water 2014). The Great Lakes will not be immune to climate change effects. While
cities on the ocean coasts experience sea-level rise, scientists forecast that in the Great
Lakes, rising air and water temperatures will decrease water levels through evaporation, as
well as lead to larger and more frequent algae blooms that undermine fish habitats and,
potentially, water supplies (Gronewold et al. 2013; O'Reilly et al. 2015). Climate change
will also affect the generation, distribution, and demand for energy. One analysis suggests
that lower water levels could reduce Ontario’s hydroelectric output by 1,100 MW, at the
same time that demand for cooling systems will increase (Clean Air Partnership 2011).
Heat also reduces the efficiency of long-distance electricity transmission and distribution
systems (Aivalioti 2015).
All in all, the localized impact of weather and temperature change on ground- and
lakewater supply for urban and agricultural uses, invasive species, ecosystem function,
energy supply, and lake-based shipping is uncertain (Gregg et al. 2012). The research
suggests that the built environment and infrastructure systems lack the redundancy and
diversity to absorb climate change effects.
Standing in the background are
perennial sources of uncertainty: macroeconomic cycles, transformative technological
innovations such as automation, change in the terms of trade, energy costs, volatile
currency exchange rates, and fluctuations in access to capital. By virtue of strong linkages
to continental and world markets, the local and national economies are not islands.
Participants in the economy-themed workshop agreed that local residents, firms, and
governments have always been, and always will be, to some degree subject to decisions,
flows, and forces that are beyond their control.
Frank Clayton raised the spectre of the American Rustbelt to say that even longterm success can come to an end. After dominating global steel and automobile production
for generations, the fortunes of many American cities quickly reversed when offshore
producers produced more innovative products and undercut them on cost. The collapse of
Nortel, which had a large footprint in the Toronto region, and the radical decline of
Blackberry, are examples of champions being out-innovated and out-competed. Canadian
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exporters know that the exchange rate drives their competitiveness. Canadian goods and
services producers came to depend on a weak dollar in the mid-1980s and again in the late
1990s and early 2000s. When the exchange rate rapidly returned to par in 2011–12 for the
first time since the mid-1970s, many businesses were virtually wiped out, especially in the
manufacturing sector (Oschinski, Chan, and Kobrinsky 2014; Spiro 2013).
Ontario is a magnet for foreign direct investment by market share and dollar
volume, topping California and Texas as the largest North American receiving jurisdiction
for greenfield projects (FDI Intelligence 2015: 10). While the Conference Board (2012)
and others view foreign direct investment as a driver of innovation, productivity, and
income growth, FDI also renders local economies vulnerable to decisions by foreign firms
whose material interests may lie elsewhere. There is however an unfortunate history of the
Ontario and Canadian governments giving foreign branch plants loans and concessions in
exchange for production and employment guarantees, only to have those firms use the
threat of closure to bargain for more incentives once the agreements expire. Cluster-based
economic development strategies may embed mobile capital in the local economy. One
participant brought up the case of California-based semiconductor maker AMD, which
acquired local graphics processor firm ATI Technologies in 2006. AMD has maintained the
Canadian operation because of strong local linkages.
While southern Ontario has benefited from proximity to and integration with the
American market in the past, it remains subject to external pressures and sources of
uncertainty. The challenge is to ensure the resilience of the regional economy by fostering
sectoral diversity and redundant capacities (Wolfe 2010). This points to nurturing a diverse
portfolio of clusters that embed talent and investment as opposed to inducing standalone
investments with subsidies that may be outbid by other jurisdictions. It also points to the
need for investment in hard and soft infrastructures that support skills development and
innovation, improve businesses’ access to capital, and lower the cost of mobility of people
and goods.

Internal vulnerabilities
In The Resilience Dividend, Rodin (281) concludes that there is less urgency to
act in stable times, so governments tend to reactively respond to crises instead of
proactively anticipating the future. The governance challenge is therefore to “reduce
reliance on crisis as a driver of policy change” (300). Matthias Sweet agreed that slow-burn
problems often lose out to crises: “if a problem needs to be loud for it to be worth
addressing, that’s problematic because some problems are going to be sexier and some are
not.”
Participants in the fiscal- and economy-themed workshops agreed that decades of
steady growth and abundant natural assets and locational advantages have bred
complacency regarding the region’s social and economic problems. Richard Joy stated that
Complacency.
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the Toronto region’s relative economic stability during the Great Recession and its legacy
assets have “in some ways masked a lot of our larger challenges and allowed us to not face
them.” Complacency also stems from the relative absence of crisis. Many of the region’s
vulnerabilities have emerged gradually and many of the risks it faces are long-term and
cumulative. It is easier to be complacent about slow shifts than sudden shocks.
Inadequate strategic regional coordination. One

outcome of complacency is inadequate
regional coordination. Several workshop participants decried the region’s disjointed local
governance, seeing in today’s panoply of municipalities a situation analogous to that which
existed before the creation of Metro Toronto in 1954. At that time, what is now the City
of Toronto contained 13 municipalities within what was then York County; today, the
GTAH contains 25 municipalities and the Greater Golden Horseshoe 110. Metro was
created to centralize capital borrowing to modernize infrastructure, influence the urban
development pattern through infrastructure provision and subdivision control, operate a
regional transit system (the TTC), and manage regional roads. It was enormously successful
in the 1950s and 1960s (although allowed to wither in the 1970s) because it could borrow
at lower interest rates than its constituent municipalities and directly link infrastructure
provision to regulatory land-use planning. Frank Clayton believes a new regional
government is necessary to coordinate economic, land, and infrastructural development at
a broad scale: “My view is to take the census metropolitan area [and] create a [two-tier]
government like we used to have in Metropolitan Toronto, with each of the regions and
the City of Toronto becoming the lower tier. At least then you’d be doing the planning
and financing, everything, on the economic regional basis. And if you don’t have that,
you’re in trouble.”
The creation of a two-tier regional government has not been seriously proposed
since the Golden task force (GTA Task Force 1996), and local government restructuring
has been politically toxic since the provincially imposed amalgamations of the late 1990s
and 2000s. Instead, the province has become the de facto regional government. Earlier
provincial plans to which municipal plans must conform—the Niagara Escarpment
(Ontario 1985) and Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plans (Ontario 2002)—have been
supplemented by the Greenbelt Plan (Ontario 2005) and the Growth Plan for the Greater
Golden Horseshoe (Ontario 2006). The province also created Metrolinx, a new regional
agency to plan, coordinate, and partially operate transit systems.
The emergence of a durable regional perspective and voice has been stifled,
however, by the absence of a regional representative institution through which local leaders
can manage intermunicipal conflict and define and solve collective problems. Symptomatic
of the lack of a regional perspective is the province’s recent abolition, under suburban
pressure, of “GTA pooling,” through which municipalities in the surrounding regions
transferred funds to the City of Toronto to operate social programs. Several workshop
participants also argued that intermunicipal competition for investment produces perverse

24

outcomes. While some employment zones are deserving of preservation, the absence of a
coordinated regional employment land strategy means that municipal economic
development planning is driven more by the aspirational chase for a lucrative nonresidential property tax base than marketplace reality (Blais 2015: 60). Peter Thoma
suggested that for municipalities,
preserving employment land has become an end in itself. … [Municipalities] all
have teams of economic development practitioners who are trying to sell their
specific community to investment interests. I understand the competitive
dimension that exists between neighbouring municipalities within the region. But
when you actually look at where the jobs are going and the types of jobs and
environments that young people aspire to work in, they’re not the kinds of jobs
that are on the lands that policymakers are so adamant to protect through land-use
controls.
It remains to be seen whether investment attraction strategy will become more
regionalized with the impending consolidation of the Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance
and Invest Toronto (a City of Toronto agency). Similarly, it is unclear whether Metrolinx
will evolve beyond being a planner and operator of regional bus and rail lines to become a
more robust coordinator of local transit systems. For example, will the fare system be
regionalized, as in Montréal and Vancouver’s multi-zone systems, or will crossing municipal
boundaries continue to entail paying double fares? Certainly the region-wide adoption of
the Presto digital fare card would enable moving to the zone-based collection and sharing
of revenues across multiple providers.
At several points in the workshop discussion, participants expressed concern that
the logic of electoral competition, as well as political friction between provincial and local
governments, have inhibited evidence-based regional planning and the pooling of
municipal resources to pursue capital projects and operate services of regional scope and
significance. Effective planning and coordination of social, economic, and environmental
governance in Greater Toronto hinges on the provincial government actively maintaining
its role as the keystone of the regional governance system. Remove the provincial keystone
and the system risks tumbling down.
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of
complacency is the gradual emergence of the infrastructure deficit. The 1950s–1970s were
a golden age of growth-related infrastructure expansion in Ontario. Indeed, much of the
stock of highway, transit, water and sewer, and electricity production and transmission
infrastructure dates from that period. Since the economic malaise of the 1970s, there has
been a tug-of-war between the pressing need for growth-related expansion of
infrastructure systems and the maintenance and replacement of existing ones. Nationally,
public investment in new and existing infrastructure declined by more than half between
A “missed generation” of infrastructure investment.
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the late 1950s and the early 2000s as a proportion of GDP (Mackenzie 2013). At the same
time that the capital stock built during the boom years aged toward the end of its
operational life, the proportion of public investment spent on maintenance has declined
since the 1990s (Félio 2012; RCCAO 2010: 14).
The result is a local and national infrastructure deficit or, as Tom Smith put, an
“infrastructure debt, accumulated over a generation.” One recent analysis finds that to
maximize hard infrastructure systems’ contribution to GDP growth, Canada would have to
increase total national spending on infrastructure by 62% and almost double the proportion
going toward maintenance for the foreseeable future. Not doing so would leave 40% of
real per-capita GDP on the table (RCCAO 2010: 21–23). Richard Joy estimated that if
transportation, housing, electricity, water and wastewater infrastructure are included,
Greater Toronto’s capital funding gap may be something on the order of $4 billion per
year.
The infrastructure deficit undermines the region’s economic and environmental
resilience. Decaying and inadequate infrastructure discourages business investment,
suppresses economic growth, and imposes significant social costs on residents (see, for
example, Ragan and Vuong 2015). Lack of investment in a diverse and redundant
infrastructure portfolio has reduced economic competitiveness and residents’ quality of life,
while inhibiting proactive mitigation of risks associated with climate change and the
ageing society. Matti Siemiatycki succinctly summed up the risks associated with a
widening infrastructure gap:
I think we’ve clearly missed a generation of infrastructure investment and I think
that’s a huge risk. And when I say infrastructure, I mean it really broadly:
transportation is the obvious one that everyone talks about, but public housing and
a lot of our other infrastructure is decaying. I think we have a problem with both
finding the money for these things, but also finding the political will. … These
things are starting to compound. When it comes to productivity: our deficit in
terms of infrastructure is contributing to that. When we talk about environmental
sustainability, our deficit in terms of infrastructure is contributing to that, and I
would also include social equity in there as well.
Instead of occurring incrementally, capital investment tends to be “lumpy,”
happening only when breakdowns provoke crisis or governments engage in
countercyclical stimulus spending. Hilary Holden and Matti Siemiatycki both argued that
major public infrastructure investments are sufficiently infrequent, making each
opportunity feel like the last. In such an environment, politicians scramble, “elbows out,” to
support local pet projects, leading to ad hoc and often suboptimal outcomes. “We are not
good at prioritizing regionally or integrating the evaluation of projects into political
decisions,” said Siemiatycki. Stop-and-go construction is more expensive than incremental
system expansion. This is because expertise and administrative capacities are dismantled and
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rebuilt on a project-by-project basis. Building in bursts rather than incrementally also
drives up the cost of projects’ labour and material inputs. This echoes a recent McKinsey
Global Institute report, which argued that global infrastructure demand could be met at
40% less cost if practices were improved: “On the whole, countries continue to invest in
poorly conceived projects, take a long time to approve them, miss opportunities to
innovate in how to deliver them, and then don’t make the most of existing assets before
opting to build expensive new capacity” (MGI 2013: 4).
Self-imposed fiscal incapacity. The

perennial question, of course, is where infrastructure
investment capital should come from. As Toby Lennox colourfully put it, “we are smoking
something if we think infrastructure is going to come without someone paying for it.”
Four options are commonly proposed, often in combination: borrowing, raising taxes,
capturing increases in land value due to infrastructure expansion, and public-private
partnerships. However, the full use of each has been inhibited by political opposition,
resulting in self-imposed fiscal incapacity.
It is sensible to fund durable infrastructure with borrowing because the cost can be
spread over the lifetime of assets. As noted above, interest rates are low and the
governments’ balance sheets are in relatively good shape overall. Fiscal capacity is, however,
unevenly distributed across levels of government. While economists agree that the
municipal sector as a whole can sustainably assume more debt, some growing
municipalities, including York Region, have reached provincially imposed borrowing
limits. Robert Hatton noted that municipalities are increasing their borrowing capacity
while reducing recurring debt servicing costs by issuing longer-term bonds. While 10-year
bonds were once the norm, the City of Toronto is now issuing some 30-year bonds—a
term still shorter than the expected life of the underlying asset. While the size of annual
payments is reduced, this may result in higher overall servicing costs. Most provinces’
borrowing capacity is constrained by substantial and increasing debt loads. Ontario has
remained in deficit since the Great Recession and, as a result, its net debt-to-GDP ratio
increased from 26% to 39% between 2008 and 2016 (Ontario 2016). Given the Ontario
economy’s pace of growth, this ratio will remain elevated for the foreseeable future (FAO
2015). Given the relatively constrained borrowing capacity of municipal and provincial
governments, the federal government may have the greatest capacity to engage in deficit
financing for infrastructure expenditure. The new federal government’s decision to incur
deficits to fund a greater share of infrastructure represents a move in this direction (see box
“A more strategic federalism?”).
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A more strategic federalism?
Early signs from the new federal government elected in October 2015 suggest that Ottawa’s
increased spending on infrastructure renewal will be guided by long-term productivity
enhancement rather than short-term stimulus, and will be sustained over a long period of time.
Ottawa has also signalled that it will increase its funding from one-third to one-half of project costs,
an amount more in line with the share of incremental revenue it will receive from productive capital
investments, and also give provinces more discretion over how money is spent.

One consequence of federal and provincial retrenchment and municipal
governments’ resistance to incurring capital debt is the common practice of transferring
financial risk to the private sector. Under so-called front-ending agreements, whereby
developers agree to finance and install infrastructure systems on their own, the developer
takes on debt that would otherwise be borrowed by government albeit at higher interest
rates. These costs are then passed the cost on to the consumer. This has two negative
effects. First, it drives up rents and prices for residential and employment real estate, with
negative social and economic impacts. According to Lloyd Cherniak, another consequence
is a dramatic increase over the past decade in the amount of borrowing risk assumed by
developers. This has driven up the size of development projects and reduces the number of
competitive players in the market. Ultimately, it may lead developers to shift investment to
jurisdictions where they are exposed to less risk. There is anecdotal evidence that some
large Ontario developers have expanded into other North American housing markets for
this reason.
A second option is to increase current revenues. Participants agreed that that
governments’ general unwillingness in recent years to increase or shift the impact of taxes
inhibits our collective ability to meet current infrastructure needs, let alone head off future
crises. They also agreed that new revenues lie with new taxes of broad incidence, thereby
6
spreading burdens across the population. In the City of Toronto context, Peter Thoma
lamented that politicians have shied away from taking full advantage of new revenue
sources conferred by the 2006 City of Toronto Act. (The Municipal Land Transfer Tax is the
exception, but it exposes the City to potential risk by hitching its fiscal health to the
continuation of the housing boom.) Similarly, provincial and municipal governments have
ruled out several potential revenue streams identified by business leaders and expert task
forces as the most productive, predictable, and equitable ways to fund transit expansion:
increases to the income tax, the HST, and the gas tax, and also the introduction of road
tolls. Despite moves to raise the top marginal tax rate at the provincial and federal levels,
the political conditions of increasing general revenues remain elusive.
6

Generally speaking, the incidence of a tax refers to the distribution of its burden across society. Taxes
of narrow incidence, such as “sin taxes” on cigarettes and alcohol, are borne by a small segment of society,
while taxes of broad incidence, such as the HST and income tax, are paid by almost everyone. A progressive
tax skews the burden toward upper-income earners, while a regressive tax’s burden falls on low-income
households.
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A third potential source is to capture growth-related land-value uplift through the
property tax or development charges. Workshop participants disagreed on whether landvalue uplift would be sufficient or appropriate to cover capital costs. Tom Smith
acknowledged that “there is always a [public] cost of development and most of those are
fair. And there should be a public benefit from private undertakings.” But, in his opinion,
“growth can’t pay for what’s needed now. … We have to shift away from relying on
growth to pay for growth-related infrastructure and the infrastructure deficit.” Similarly,
Frank Clayton argued that the benefits of new infrastructure are enjoyed not only by new
residents. Rather, benefits are sufficiently dispersed that everyone has a stake in
infrastructure expansion. To the extent that it is impossible to disentangle the proportion of
infrastructure costs that benefit new versus existing residents, the current emphasis on
development charges may be misplaced.
Finally, governments may use public-private partnerships (P3s) to access capital
from private investors, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds to achieve public
objectives. Ideally, P3s may not only reduce public debt exposure for large up-front
investments, but also create incentives for efficient and timely project delivery and design
innovation. Several participants in the fiscal- and economy-themed workshops argued that
Ontario has lagged behind other jurisdictions in pursuing innovative financing and
governance techniques, including P3s, the use of project management intermediaries to
drive innovation, and the use of public corporations empowered to borrow on their own
account against future revenues. Toby Lennox argued that pension funds are ready to invest
in large projects, particularly in higher-order transit, but that the size of Canadian deals is
not large enough and, as a result, there are “large pools of capital going elsewhere.”
Siemiatycki and Robert Hatton stressed that the public’s dominant image of P3s as a longterm operating concession over which the public sector has little control, as in the case of
Highway 407, has undermined the public image of P3s and does not capture the full range
of possibilities (see box “Perils of P3s”).
Perils of P3s
While P3s are framed as transferring financial risk to the private sector, poorly designed contracts
may create costly problems. For example, Siemiatycki argued that inflexible long-term contracts
may undermine adaptation to changing circumstances. He shared a story of a design-build-financemaintain P3 in the UK to build schools, where the government became locked into paying for underenrolled facilities that could not be closed or converted to other community uses. Siemiatycki
argued that maximizing public benefits and asset flexibility while minimizing risk can be achieved
with shorter contract terms and unbundling design from construction and financing from operating
costs. Robert Hatton also said that municipalities should be cautious about “signing away your
revenue stream,” as occurred with Highway 407.
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The infrastructure deficit has compounded due to the political failure to allocate
resources toward necessary expansion, maintenance, and replacement projects. This has
undermined the region’s social, economic, and environmental resilience. Taxation and debt
remain politically fraught as leaders have failed to make the case for funding public
investments not only to accommodate and support growth, but also to maintain existing
systems.
Lack of alignment between resources and policy goals. The

provincial government makes
decisions regarding new major transportation infrastructure while municipalities are
responsible for land-use regulation. Transit lines are being built with the expectation that
they will spur the redevelopment of surrounding areas in a manner consistent with broader
policy objectives, not least ensuring sufficient ridership to justify the investment and the
creation of “complete” communities that incorporate residential, employment, and amenity
uses. As Richard Joy and Hilary Holden noted in the workshops, the provincial
government has not required municipalities to rezone land as a condition of receiving
funding. As a result, infrastructure investment may not deliver on its transformative
potential and require higher than expected subsidies.
Similarly, workshop participants brought up examples in which some agencies’
priorities worked against land-use goals. Lloyd Cherniak noted that in his experience as a
large-scale developer, school board requirements for school yard sizes and one-storey
school buildings have had the unintended consequence of consuming more land when
developers were being told to design and build communities more densely. “If you want
intensification you have to think in terms of public assets as well. Schools are one example;
but they are the worst.” Similarly, the location of jobs and amenities in low-density, singleuse employment and retail zones separated from residential areas inhibits access by means
other than the automobile. Dependence on any one mode of transportation undermines
resilience because the overall mobility system lacks diversity and redundancy.

The region largely evaded the Great Recession, its
population and employment levels continuing to increase. Still, the economy has by some
measures been stalled since the early 1990s recession, a quarter-century ago
(Boston Consulting 1995; Burleton 2002). As Juan Gomez put it, “we’ve plateaued.” The
value of Ontario’s exports to the United States has declined over the past decade, in large
part due to the erosion of urban manufacturing (TRBOT 2015). Regionally,
manufacturing’s proportion of all jobs declined by half since the late 1980s (TWIF 2009),
and 200,000 manufacturing jobs were lost across the Greater Goldern Horseshoe between
2001 and 2014 (Blais 2015: 33). The City of Toronto alone lost 117,000 manufacturing
jobs between 1983 and 2013, many of them during the restructuring that followed the
adoption of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States (City of Toronto 2014c).
(For comparison, banking and financial services employment increased by 78,060 over the
Lagging economic performance.
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same period.) At the same time, exporting firms that grew too accustomed to the low
dollar during the late 1990s suffered when the exchange rate spiked during the western
commodity boom.
Despite a large, diverse, and highly educated labour market, studies point to
persistently low labour productivity, higher unemployment rates, a weak innovation
system, and lagging inward foreign direct investment compared to peer cities, producing a
widening “prosperity gap” (Conference Board 2012, 2015; TRBOT 2014a, 2014b).
Damian Dupuy voiced concern that the innovation gap may be counting Toronto out of
rapidly changing high-value-added sectors such as advanced manufacturing: “We have very
low business investment in innovation. Innovation is really anchoring change in
manufacturing. It is anchoring change in the global economy and we are not there yet.”
Poverty rates are higher than in past decades.
Particularly concerning is growing child poverty in all parts of the region. Child poverty
has very long effects, stunting future educational attainment, earnings, and psychological
wellbeing. Between 1990 and 2005 the incidence of child poverty increased from 24% to
32% in the City of Toronto. A half-million children in the City of Toronto live in lowincome families (Polanyi et al. 2014). While the rates are lower, child poverty also roughly
doubled in Mississauga, Oakville, and Brampton over the same period. Half of Ontario’s
children in poverty live in the GTA (CAS 2008). Poverty is also experienced
disproportionately by specific ethnic groups. The 2011 National Household Survey
showed that in the City of Toronto, people of African, Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and
Central Asian descent are considerably more likely to live in poverty than those descended
from Europeans and East and Southeast Asians. To some degree this stems from how
recently particular groups have immigrated as integration into social and economic life
increases over time. Poverty negatively correlates with myriad social indicators. A recent
report from Health Quality Ontario (2016) found that 28% of people in the poorest
income quintile do not have access to enough food to meet basic dietary needs. Lowincome people are also at higher risk of chronic health conditions and have shorter life
expectancies.
The increasing prevalence of poverty has accompanied rising income and wealth
inequality.7 The Toronto census metropolitan area’s Gini Index—a common measure of
inequality—for individuals and households has steadily increased since 1970, and by a
larger amount than any other Canadian metropolitan area (United Way 2015: 39; Walks
2015: 152). Most of the increase is the result of rising incomes at the high end, with a
Rising poverty and increasing inequality.

7

The existence of income and wealth inequality does not necessarily mean that those at the bottom are
impoverished, nor does rising inequality necessarily correlate with rising poverty. Poverty and inequality are
related, however, because government-led alleviation of poverty is funded through progressive taxation—
the burden of which falls disproportionately on those with higher incomes.
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corresponding shrinking in the proportion of households with middle-range incomes
(Walks 2010: 135).
Declining social mobility and rising precarious employment, especially for youth and immigrants.

The engine of the formation of the Toronto region’s postwar middle class was secure, often
unionized, high-income manufacturing employment. Deindustrialization has transformed
the nature of work in the region. The region’s labour market is divided between two kinds
of service-sector jobs: those that are low-paying, less-skilled, and insecure, and high-paying,
high-skilled “creative-class” jobs that are well-remunerated and confer benefits. Shahil
Thomas’s assessment was direct: “There’s no middle area anymore—the labour market is
split.”
Work has also become more precarious—temporary, without benefits, and with
variable hours. On average, precarious workers earn considerably less than those with
permanent jobs. Nationally, growth in part-time and low-wage employment has
outstripped gains in full-time and high-paying jobs since the 1980s (Tal 2015). This is
mirrored in the Toronto region. A recent study found that 18% of employed GTA
residents have temporary or part-time jobs and more than half work at jobs that provide
no security and benefits (PEPSO 2013, 2015). Older and less-educated workers are
considerably more likely to be involuntarily unemployed, a gap that will increase with
population ageing (TWIF 2015). Symptomatic of precarious employment is that the
“working poor” constituted 9% of the working-age population in 2012—the highest rate
among Canadian census metropolitan areas (Stapleton and Kay 2015).
Not all groups have experienced this transformation in the nature of work in the
same way. The Martin Prosperity Institute reports that in the Toronto CMA, precarious
routine-service-sector employment has increased dramatically since 2001, and is dominated
by women, youth, the elderly, and new Canadians (MPI 2013). Disturbingly, a growing
proportion of people with bachelor’s and graduate degrees are employed in the bottom tier
of the service sector.
Immigrants and visible minorities are disproportionately represented among the
precariously employed. “It used to be that immigrants would come here and they would
catch up,” says Dennis Raphael. “Now we’re finding that they’re not. Statistics show that,
for immigrants of colour, wages are lower even when you account for differences in
language, training, and experience.” Juan Gomez also noted that the opportunities available
to new immigrants and the next generation are very different from the early postwar
period because there is no longer such great need for unskilled labour. Although Canada
gives preference to migrants with high educational attainment and skills, labour-market
integration is inhibited by unrecognized credentials and a lack of “Canadian experience,”
that latter emanating from subtle or overt discrimination (Preston et al. 2011).
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Income inequality plays out
geographically, separating “have” from “have-not” neighbourhoods. Echoing the work of
University of Toronto academics David Hulchanski and Alan Walks, who have mapped a
growing divide between rich and poor neighbourhoods in Canadian cities (Hulchanski
2010; Walks 2010), Shahil Thomas and Richard Matern noted that low-income residents
are increasingly concentrated in areas with poor transportation options, inadequate access
to healthy food options, and limited employment opportunities (Matern 2014; Stapleton,
Murphy, and Xing 2012; Wray 2013). Many of rental apartment tower communities are
located in postwar suburban areas that are relatively amenity-poor. The United Way (2011:
37) found that about 40% of high-rise apartment tenants were low-income in 2006. A
growing number of low-income tenants are at risk of homelessness (Paradis, Wilson, and
Logan 2014). Recent immigrant, racialized, and lone-parent families are disproportionately
represented in the low-income and tenant populations. Dennis Raphael pointed to the
many effects of poverty: “Look at the map of income. Then look at the map for diabetes,
asthma, crime, sexual assault—they’re all the same map. Every health issue under the sun is
8
correlated with income and precarious employment.”
The interaction of growing poverty rates and declining housing affordability is
creating a new social geography in the region. Several workshop participants expressed a
concern that the Toronto region will become like New York City or London, UK, where
only the wealthy can afford to live in amenity-rich areas. Richard Matern explained that
rising rents and housing costs are displacing low-income residents on a larger scale than
before. Tom Smith put it succinctly: “People can’t afford to live and work in the City of
Toronto any more. Affordability is pushing them out and congestion is pushing them back.
Everyone is reacting to those two things.”
While much of the research on socio-economic and neighbourhood polarization
has focused on the City of Toronto, the same dynamics are at work elsewhere in the
region. Jocelyn Strutt described the situation in Hamilton, where poverty is concentrated
in the downtown core while wealthy neighbourhoods tend to be in the suburbs. There, the
city is working to mitigate the negative impacts of increased interest in downtown
development on the city’s most vulnerable citizens—development that is in part spurred by
the arrival of people who have been priced out of the Toronto market. Isolation and
concentration of disadvantaged people in tower areas is as much a concern in Hamilton
and Mississauga as it is in the City of Toronto.
A growing gap between rich and poor neighbourhoods.

Rising after-tax incomes, especially at the upper end of the
income spectrum, as well as easy access to mortgage credit, have pulled housing prices
upward, putting home ownership beyond the reach of many households. For most people,
Declining housing affordability.

8

See Mikkonen and Raphael (2010); see also van Ingen et al. (2015).
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incomes have not increased at the same pace as rents and house prices, undermining
housing affordability (Burda 2013; Burleton 2015; Smetanin, Moca, and Yusuf 2015).
Property ownership drives wealth inequality. As long-time homeowners ride
property values up, the wealth gap between them and non-property-owners increases.
Those in the middle who entered the market by taking advantage of low interest rates and
relaxed down-payment requirements carry large debt loads and are vulnerable to interest
rate hikes or changes in personal circumstances, such as job loss or illness. Nationally, the
the number of highly leveraged mortgages that do not qualify for CMHC mortgage
insurance may soon overtake the number of insured ones (Watt 2015). At the end of 2009,
total household debt was 2.1 times disposable income in the Toronto region, of which
mortgage debt accounted for 72% (Walks 2013: 166–67). The same analysis showed that
debt ratios are highest in gentrifying central-city areas and outer-suburban areas that are
home to concentrations of immigrants, and lowest in high-income neighbourhoods.
There is consensus that large-scale international, and especially Chinese, investment
in urban real estate assets is responsible for some portion of the housing affordability crisis.
This is the dark side of Canada’s openness and stability. Toronto has become a magnet for
investment by global high-net-worth individuals seeking a safe harbour for their capital.
According to consultancy Knight Frank (2015), Toronto is regarded as a premier
destination by the world’s wealthy. The region’s concentration of high-net-worth
individuals exceeds Chicago and Los Angeles and is comparable to Shanghai, Paris, and
Geneva. The National Bank of Canada estimates that $20 billion flowed from China into
Toronto and Vancouver real estate in 2015 alone (McKenna 2016). Higher sale prices at
the top end reduce affordability in the rest of the market because those squeezed out at the
top drive up prices in lower tiers of the market. As the threshold to enter the ownership
market increases, would-be purchasers turn to the rental market. Increased demand for
rental housing in the absence of expanded supply drives up rents, but tenant incomes are
not increasing to match. Little purpose-built public and private rental housing has been
9
created in recent decades and the stock of both is deteriorating. Approximately 85,000
households (about 174,000 people) and growing were on the active affordable housing
waiting list in the City of Toronto at the end of 2015 (Housing Connections 2015) and
the average emergency shelter stay was over 60 days in 2011 (Polanyi et al. 2014: 16).
Workshop participants also acknowledged other drivers of rising costs for new
housing. Lloyd Cherniak pointed to rising public expectations: “People want to see largescale communities being built with all the bells and whistles from day one. The days when
somebody started off on a small house and finished his own basement and suffered a little
9

Real estate brokerages have reported a sudden increase nationwide in purpose-built rental housing
construction as pension funds, REITs, and other investors are attracted by cheap borrowing, high rents (and
therefore predictable rates of return), and robust demand for less expensive housing as high house prices
place home ownership out of reach of many potential buyers (CBRE 2015; McMahon 2015). With a little
over 1,000 rental starts annually in the Toronto region, however the number of units produced is small
relative to overall demand.
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bit are long gone.” Will Dunning pointed out that the Toronto region’s long-term rapid
growth trajectory limits affordability simply because much of our housing stock is too new:
“The private market is actually very good at providing affordable ownership and rental
housing, it just that takes them 60 to 80 years to build them.”
Cherniak, Dunning, and Frank Clayton also voiced the industry’s concern about
overly lengthy approval processes and regulatory burdens that drive up costs and limit
housing production. From this perspective, the regional housing market is subject to policy
constraints that limit the creation of sufficient supply to meet demand for specific housing
types and neighbourhood environments.
Housing unaffordability may drive some residents’ location choices. Between 2001
and 2006, over 250,000 people left the City of Toronto to settle in other municipalities in
the GTA, Simcoe County, and Waterloo Region (Wilson 2009: 7–8), although more
recent figures suggest that the outflow slowed in the second half of the last decade
(City of Toronto 2014a). (The population of the City of Toronto, and of the region as a
whole, have continued to grow because domestic out-migration has been offset by
international immigration.) Households appear to moving outwards in search of housing
that is less expensive in both absolute terms and also in relation to property size.
Escalating rents squeeze out community assets. Separately, several

participants raised concern
about the lack of protection for other kinds of land uses. For example, participants in the
society-themed workshop urged policymakers to think holistically about the physical
requirements of community-based functions such as schools and non-profit social service
organizations. Samir Sinha pointed to the transformation of Toronto’s core
neighbourhoods, where gentrification and redevelopment have driven up the rents paid by
non-profit agencies that rely on fixed grants to provide services to vulnerable groups.
Higher costs force agencies to move to cheaper locations, which disrupts care networks
and results in underserved populations. He cited the example of an organization that runs a
dementia day program:
They have received funding from the Ministry to double the number of people
they support in their community. The problem is that they are working above an
old building with limited space. … They can’t [expand their space] to serve more
clients—they’re landlocked. So they embarked on what became a two-year journey
to find more space in the same neighbourhood. They eventually had to move their
day program much further west and north because of skyrocketing property prices.
While the organization’s capacity was expanded, it was now located beyond the reach of
many of its clients. Dr. Sinha stated that his hospital emergency room has experienced a
37% rise in the number of visits by older patients in only five years, because they lack
other options. This story reveals a gap in the process of creating and maintaining complete
communities, especially in infill and redevelopment contexts.
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It is costly to change urban form and supporting infrastructure
after it is constructed. While the Toronto region is growing rapidly, a large proportion of its
urban footprint was developed in accordance with early-postwar planning ideas that
emphasized the separation of non-residential from residential uses, and high-density from
low-density housing. These ideas produced a built environment that is less resilient to
social, economic, and environmental changes because it lacks diversity and redundancy.
The result is a highly planned suburban landscape that performs poorly on a variety of
social and environmental indicators: overreliance on the automobile to access employment,
shopping, schools, and other amenities, and less efficient use of energy. This contrasts with
less rigidly organized prewar urban landscapes, whose mixed-use form, fine-grained parcel
structures and street systems, and more flexible zoning enable variable adaptations. Since
the 1990s, aspects of new suburban neighbourhoods have been planned in ways the mimic
some prewar characteristics, however analysis suggests that their performance is similar to
that of earlier postwar neighbourhoods (Hess and Sorensen 2015; Taylor and Van Nostrand
2008). More recently constructed neighbourhoods are less mixed-use, more uniform in
their range of house types, and less dense than those constructed in the 1960s. They are
also designed with street systems that are less connected and less grid-like, which inhibits
efficient travel by foot, cycling, and transit.
It is too early to tell if the “complete communities” policies adopted by the
province and municipalities over the past decade for new urban developments on rural
land will produce built environments that perform as well as prewar neighbourhoods (see
box “Complete communities”). Hess and Sorensen (2015: 148) conclude that
An inflexible built environment.

more ambitious approaches will be necessary to create the ‘complete communities’
…. It seems clear that to achieve this will require strategies to influence both
employment and retail location, issues that were hardly mentioned in [the Growth
Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe]. Changing the pattern of development
will also require a reconsideration of the role of the arterial roads grid and the
super-blocks that it creates, which have continued to be the fundamental planning
and urban form frameworks for new growth in the region.
Complete communities
The 2006 Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe defines “complete communities” as
follows:
“Complete communities meet people's needs for daily living throughout an entire lifetime by
providing convenient access to an appropriate mix of jobs, local services, a full range of housing,
and community infrastructure including affordable housing, schools, recreation and open space for
their residents. Convenient access to public transportation and options for safe, non-motorized
travel is also provided.” (s. 7, Definitions)
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It is also unclear whether the intensification of established residential areas will produce
more complete communities. While large-scale master-planned zones such as the West
Don Lands may achieve this ideal by virtue of public land ownership, selective recruitment
of anchor businesses and services, and the advanced provision of transit services, parcel-byparcel intensification projects may not contribute to fulfilling regional policy objectives,
such as the more efficient use of existing infrastructure and services. For example, a recent
Neptis Foundation analysis found that only 20% of new dwelling units and 13% of new
residents in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area between 2001 and 2011 were located
near subway stations or designated Metrolinx hubs (Burchfield and Kramer 2015: 59;
Taylor, Burchfield, and Kramer 2014: 31).
While sometimes catalyzed by public action, existing urban areas are transformed
mostly through private investment. Aderonke Akande suggested that there is a risk of
selective attention in infill and redevelopment processes. As the public and private
resources available to “reprogram” poorly performing neighbourhood environments are
limited, they cannot flow everywhere: “How do you enable transformative change in the
areas of the city that are not of interest to private-sector investors? … This is where a lot of
the towers are located. Those areas were designed in an era when the zoning was almost
exclusively residential. Now you have a population that is living there that does not own a
car. The needs are different.” The City of Toronto is working to diversify ageing rental
residential tower areas by creating incentives to retrofit buildings to increase their energy
efficiency and extend their operational life while improving safety and access to food and
recreational amenities. Toronto’s adoption of a new Residential Apartment Commercial
zoning category in 2014 may extend the scope of tower renewal by permitting new
commercial, recreational, and community uses in tower neighbourhoods originally
designed to be exclusively residential spaces. The promotion of mixed-use development in
these areas represents the diversification of the apartment neighbourhood “portfolio,” one
that may increase the resilience of their built form over time.
Contemporary planning orthodoxy aspires to a greater mix of uses, yet existing
land-use patterns and zoning practices lock in a use-segregated built environment. At least
half of all jobs are located on lands zoned exclusively for employment uses—that is, for
commercial, industrial, and logistics activities (Hemson Consulting 2005: 44). Exclusive
employment zoning was and is intended to protect residential areas from incompatible and
noxious uses, yet its effect is to reinforce automobile commuting. Similarly, the
consolidation of retail establishments into highway- or arterial-oriented “power centres”
separated from the residential urban fabric undermines access by walking, cycling, or transit
(Buliung and Hernandez 2013). Exclusive employment and retail zoning and the
preservation of underutilized lands may inhibit future adaptation to economic and
technological change. Matthias Sweet urged a regional policy focus on “special places”—
those “where intensification can deliver more value for the developer and create potential
for more and better jobs.”
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Exploring interconnected risks and policy conflicts
The workshop participants agreed that while the Toronto region possesses many assets, it
also has vulnerabilities that may undermine its social, economic, and environmental
resilience to external risks that are mostly, if not entirely, beyond the control of provincial
and local government, including macroeconomic conditions, climate change, and macrodemographic shifts (see Table 3). The governance challenge is to anticipate and mitigate
risks by reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities. The regional economy, society, natural and
built environments, and fiscal-governmental system can be viewed as portfolios of assets
whose emergent vulnerabilities may be interpreted as an erosion of diversity and
redundancy.
The workshop discussions revealed the complex interconnectedness of domains
that are often considered separately. Focusing attention on these sites of intersection will
provide the greatest returns on investment because interventions will provide mutually
reinforcing benefits across domains. As foreshadowed in Part 1, the built environment—
over which local governments have considerable influence—emerges as the pivotal site at
which risks and vulnerabilities intersect, and where the greatest returns may be achieved.
We conclude this diagnostic scan with an exploratory discussion of several potential
points of intersection, as well as points at which policy objectives may come into conflict.
The discussion is not exhaustive, but it raises the kinds of questions that might inform
anticipatory governance processes.
Is reliance on international migration a source of risk? The

region’s population growth depends
almost entirely on international migration. Without it, the population of the Toronto
region’s core, suburbs, and the region as a whole, would decrease in absolute terms.
International migration also slows population ageing relative to other parts of Canada.
Toronto’s ability to attract migrants depends on its ability to deliver quality of life and
absorb them into the labour market. Both are under threat due to suboptimal builtenvironment and infrastructural variables (unaffordable housing and long commutes) and
socio-economic variables (elevated poverty rates and barriers to stable and wellremunerated work). The Toronto region risks economic decline and increased poverty and
inequality if its value proposition to migrants diminishes relative to other places. On the
other hand, some participants argued that Toronto’s attractiveness is assured by the presence
of established emigre communities and its relative stability and performance compared to
other parts of the world. Banking on this may be another emanation of complacency,
however, exposing the region to risk. What is clear is that the region’s economic and social
health are closely hitched to continued immigration and successful settlement.

38

Table 3: Summary of the Toronto region’s assets, vulnerabilities, and risks
Domain
Natural and built
environment

Social

Fiscalgovernmental

Climate change
(impact on water
systems, extreme
weather events,

Migration
(international,
domestic, intrametropolitan)

Unpredictable
federal and
provincial fiscal
and policy

temperature)

Population ageing

support

Infrastructure
deficit

Inflexible built
environment

Rising inequality,
poverty

Complacency
Barriers to inter-

Weak innovation
system

Vulnerable
infrastructure
(energy,

Neighbourhood
polarization

municipal
collective action

Declining social
mobility

Tax base erosion

Economic
External risks

Technological
innovation
Business cycle
Exchange rate
Interest rates
Foreign direct
investment
decisions
Factor costs
(energy)

Internal
vulnerabilities

Low productivity

stormwater
management)

Declining housing
affordability
Ageing affordable
housing stock

Public and
political
resistance to
taxation

Displacement of
community
organizations
Assets

Agglomeration

Inland location

Tolerance

Political stability

Growth

Access to fresh
water

Social diversity

Honest
government

Economic
diversity

Arable land

Proximity to
markets
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High educational
attainment

Relative fiscal
prudence

The
external risks discussed will interact in ways that may have profound impacts on tax effort
and incidence, with implications for the timing of investment. Much of the money that
will be spent maintaining, replacing, and building new infrastructure will be borrowed, and
over long terms. This is sensible as interest rates are at historic lows and borrowing enables
costs to spread over the lifetime of the asset it funds. The money to repay the principal and
interest to lenders will come from future revenues.
As labour force participation declines due to population ageing and automation,
federal and provincial governments may experience erosion of personal income tax
revenues. This will occur even as demand for health care increases. Forecasts suggest that
personal retirement savings and public and private pensions will be insufficient to maintain
quality of life as longevity increases. Elder poverty may increase in the absence of expanded
public income supports, which must be funded through payroll contributions or general
taxation. Increasing the eligibility age for benefits would recognize the capacity of healthy
older people to work longer and reduce fiscal stress by turning recipients into contributors.
(In this context, the Ontario government’s move to introduce an expanded contributory
pension scheme is sensible, while the federal government’s reduction of the Old Age
Security eligibility age is not.) Municipal property tax revenues may also decline because
seniors’ propensity to move and purchasing power declines as they age, driving down
property values (Takáts 2010). Rising income and wealth inequality may also erode
support for general progressive taxation and income redistribution. Some political
sociologists have argued that support for income redistribution will decline if politics
becomes framed as a zero-sum battle between “makers” and “takers” (Banting and Myles
2013; Green, Riddell, and St-Hilaire 2016).
In this context, governments at all levels may come to rely increasingly on user fees
and consumption taxes, the regressive nature of which will disproportionately burden the
less well-off, exacerbating poverty and inequality. This raises the question of whether
governments should raise more revenues now to finance present and future investments
because the money may not be available later.

How might population ageing and inequality undermine fiscal capacity to mitigate future risks?

How can built environments be made more resilient? The

creation of so-called “complete
communities” is an important goal of provincial land-use policies. The Growth Plan calls
for neighbourhoods to be “well-designed, offer transportation choices, accommodate
people at all stages of life and have the right mix of housing, a good range of jobs, and easy
access to stores and services to meet daily needs” and for “community infrastructure” to be
planned in concert with land use. There is a risk, however, that framing the “completeness”
of neighbourhoods as a fixed, near-term end-state will inhibit adaptation to changing
circumstances. Resilient neighbourhoods must be planned not only for the needs of
residents of today, but also for the needs of those who may live there in 20, 50, and 100
years. Planning with the area’s future residents in mind may reduce the problems associated
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with inflexible built environments highlighted by Aderonke Akande (tower
neighbourhoods) and Samir Sinha (senior-unfriendly residential environments). The future,
however, is uncertain. The challenge is to imagine urban built environments that can adapt
to perform well under a variety of possible futures. As discussed in Part 1, one approach is
to think of neighbourhoods as portfolios of assets, the composition of which may evolve as
conditions change without compromising the quality of life of residents or their
contribution to the region’s economic productivity.
Adaptation may be enabled in several ways. First, buildings and neighbourhoods
can be constructed to accommodate a broad range of occupancy and use patterns. Dennis
Raphael and Samir Sinha pointed to the importance of creating buildings and
neighbourhoods whose physical program is flexible and multifunctional. Raphael pointed
to the St. Lawrence neighbourhood as Toronto’s best example of a district that combines
diverse uses, often within a single building: schools, ownership and rental housing, small
businesses, and community facilities such as libraries and social service agencies. Viewing
neighbourhood-scale built environments as portfolios is a way of understanding why some
neighbourhoods maintain their stability while others decline. Fine-grained and diversified
urban form may enable more successful adaptation to changing circumstances over time,
including the needs of an ageing population, than single-use and undifferentiated built
environments. This prescription has affinities with Jane Jacobs’s argument in The Death and
Life of Great American Cities (1961) that successful cities evolve in a condition of “organized
complexity.”
Renée Gomes explained that Waterfront Toronto is encouraging flexibility by
requiring minimum ground floor heights in condo buildings to permit future commercial
uses and LEED Gold compliance to reduce future maintenance costs. Similarly, Diego
Morettin described his experience with hospital design:
You try to keep in mind that you’re in a 40-year cycle, changes in practice, in
disease, in things you don’t know might happen, and you want to make sure that
your infrastructure can handle those changes. We’ve seen a huge shift in policy
regarding the resilience of buildings. As an example, we used to design a building
that would have emergency power for critical systems only, such as people on life
support, whereas now we see building infrastructure designed with redundancy to
support operations and services during a wider range of adverse events.
The discussion revealed a tension between understanding flexibility as deregulation and the
use of regulation to promote flexibility. Tom Smith remarked, “You can’t be too
prescriptive. You have to harness the momentum and layer things on top of that.” Dennis
Raphael offered a caution, however. Relaying a story of a developer refusing an offer of
extra density to build affordable units, he said that sometimes incentives do not work even
if they are generous because developers do not want the responsibility: “Sometimes you
have to regulate.”
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This leads to a second point: the need for flexible community facilities that can
evolve as neighbourhood population profiles and conditions change. These facilities may
be thought of as portfolio of productive assets with variable and evolving components.
School enrolments and demand for children’s daycare and elderly long-term care services
fluctuate on a generational time horizon. Viewing each function in isolation is short
sighted. Instead they should be understood as a portfolio of community assets whose
composition changes over time. If the physical space that houses these functions was
protected, it could be adapted to meet changing needs. Workshop participants presented an
image of a flexible space—perhaps several floors of a mixed-use building—that could be
transformed from a school and daycare to a provider of adult and senior day programs and
back again over the lifetime of the building. Samir Sinha and Richard Matern suggested
that the physical space occupied by social services agencies should be protected or
subsidized to avoid displacement when their rents increase. “Remove that obstacle,” Sinha
said, “make sure that the land cost is not the barrier for service providers.” The province is
taking preliminary steps in this direction as it develops a “community hubs” strategy for
the more flexible use of existing public facilities such as schools and community centres,
including the colocation and integration of non-profit social service organizations (Pitre
2015).
Resilient urban form
The notion of designing “complete communities” to perform well under a range of potential future
conditions is consonant with the findings of a recent project by the London School of Economics on
the resilience of urban form (Smith 2013). They conceptualized “resilience” as “the conditions of
both urban form and its management over time that enable localities to persist in attracting and
generating use and value and/or to adapt in order to remain viable and productive” (7). The
research team looked at the historical development and evolution of eight urban districts of various
ages, including London’s Mayfair and Belgravia; New York’s Hudson Square; Reston, Virginia; Irvine,
California; Opéra in Paris; and Singapore’s Chinatown. They conclude that resilient urban form:
• sustains sufficient density to make adequate use of infrastructure and support a diversity of uses
while not inhibiting the economic, social, and cultural potentialities of the public realm;
• integrates different transport options with diverse street-based activities;
• permits change in use over time in ways that facilitate and enhance economically sustainable use;
• incorporates publicly accessible and biodiverse green and open space;
• accommodates diverse tenure types to share resources and amenities across socio-economic
groups; and
• has stable property values over time.
They conclude that the planning and design of resilient urban districts requires long-term
anticipation of possible change at the urban scale, as well as careful stewardship of private property
and the public realm to enable positive evolution.
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Third, the portfolio metaphor can also be applied to urban open spaces. Workshop
participants Brenda Webster and Yvonne Yeung described a growing “green infrastructure”
movement in landscape architecture and environmental design to introduce diversity into
specific features and projects by making them multifunctional (Ahern 2011; Arup 2014a;
Brown et al. 2015). For example, public green space may be designed to function as a
recreational amenity for a variety of age groups, a storm water management system, a flood
and urban heat island mitigation device, a multi-modal mobility corridor, a species habitat,
a carbon sink, and a catalyst for neighbourhood-scale investment. Viewed this way, a
humble neighbourhood park can be understood as a portfolio that delivers immediate
social, public health, economic, and environmental benefits while mitigating future risks.
Processes for siting, sizing, and designing urban open spaces should consider all of the
services they provide.
Is it possible to create appropriate financial incentives to create desirable development patterns
without imposing undue burdens on those least able to pay? The

recurring themes of how to
finance infrastructure expansion and replacement in ways that promote desirable urban
development patterns and positive social outcomes are closely intertwined. Cherise Burda
and Craig Applegath argued for the renovation of the existing public finance system. They
argued that some forms of hard infrastructure, such as sewer, water, and road systems, have
been shown to operate at a loss in low-density suburbs, meaning that high-density areas
subsidize low-density areas. Applegath called for the replacement of municipality-wide
average-cost pricing of services with location-specific true-cost pricing: “Stop subsidizing
suburbs. It costs the taxpayer more overall. If we make the suburbs unaffordable, people
will get over their fear of density.” Burda applied this to transportation, noting that “we’re
used to driving for free”—when in fact the costs of roads and associated infrastructure are
funded out of general revenues. Hilary Holden, in a discussion about the economic cost of
delays to goods movement on congested roads, offered what she called a “simple solution:
you have to price people out to make that congestion go away so you can get the freight
traffic moving. You need to get more people paying the externalities of their driving trips.”
Echoing longstanding economic thought, Frank Clayton argued that user-pay is the best
approach: “As much as possible all infrastructure should be financed through user charges.
If you can find the beneficiaries, they should be paying for it.”
An unresolved difficulty with removing perverse incentives and embracing userpay is that its impact is likely regressive. The impacts of true-cost pricing and user-pay will
be felt most intensely by residents who lack the current income and accumulated savings
to alter their housing and travel choices. Matti Siemiatycki noted that increasing or
diversifying the application of user fees cannot come at the expense of social equity: “You
need to make sure that those at lower end of the income spectrum are not adversely
impacted” through progressive income redistribution and means-tested rebates.
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Beyond this, it is unclear what will happen to inefficient urban form when it is
made more expensive. Will its value decline as people move to more efficient locations?
Will it become a preserve for those who can afford to pay for inefficiency, thereby rising in
value? Or will it attract transformative public and private investment that reduces its
operating costs? As discussed, existing built environments are difficult and costly to change.
Poorly performing urban environments do not simply disappear.
Separately, some workshop participants advocated for capturing increases in land
value induced by redevelopment and infrastructure expansion to pay for up-front capital
expenditures. Frank Clayton argued that Ontario’s current value property assessment
system already does this well: “Use the current market value assessment. Anything that
improves the value of land or buildings, be it transit going in, or roads going in—current
value assessment accounts for it.” Tom Smith argued for a simple extraction of value at the
time of re-zoning: “For intensifying along transit corridors, you do it at the time of rezoning. Move the zoning from x to y and take some percentage of that value increase as a
payment.” Discussing Markham’s strategy, Yvonne Yeung emphasized how getting the
design fundamentals right—energy efficiency, tree plantings, a strong public realm, and the
early delivery of community facilities—attracts high-value development. Similarly, Brenda
Webster discussed how Waterfront Toronto’s early design and installation of parks and
other community assets, before even the buildings were begun, generated public interest
and solidified the value proposition for private developers. The fundamental incentive,
then, is to encourage high-value development in order to maximize land-value uplift.
Indeed, the Urban Land Institute makes the case for resilience on the basis of the financial
returns it produces (McCormick and Marshall 2015).
The difficulty of a financing strategy based on land-value capture is that it may
exacerbate housing unaffordability and further displace nongovernmental community
service agencies. One solution is to use regulation to require developers to incorporate less
expensive units in their projects. (Indeed, the province’s proposed Promoting Affordable
Housing Act would strengthen municipal powers to do so.) Yet regulation in the absence of
public subsidy either drives up the cost of the other units or produces very small units that
accommodate only certain types of households. Another solution is to expand public
ownership of housing and buildings containing private and non-profit community
facilities. This is unlikely to occur without raising taxes.
This is related to a second difficulty—the potential unrecoverability of capital costs
and the potential need for permanent operating subsidy. In essence, growth may not be
able to pay for growth. Matthias Sweet noted that transit is a difficult nut to crack because
all rides are subsidized: “There are no really good rates of return for the private sector in
financing the capital side of transit. You need to look at the value creation beyond fares.”
The same is true of social housing—its purpose is to be run at a loss, for if its residents
could pay its true cost a subsidy would not be required. A more profound uncertaintydriven risk is that many infrastructure improvements and redevelopment projects may
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never repay their cost. As many American jurisdictions that experimented with taxincrement financing have discovered, increased property tax revenue due to land-value
uplift often falls short of expectations. Some of the most expensive infrastructure and
facility projects involve replacement rather than expansion. These interventions are
unlikely to generate increased land values and so must be funded from general rather than
incremental revenues.

3. The political challenge: selling resilience
Workshop participants acknowledged that proactive resilience-oriented policymaking and
planning will be a hard political sell. The range and scale of upfront investment in hard
infrastructure and soft services envisioned would require significant modification to the
current system of taxation and expenditure, and would run up against public skepticism
regarding the efficacy and efficiency of government. This paper concludes with a reflection
on the potential foundations of a new public narrative to support investment in the service
of a more resilient economy, society, and environment.
Focus on quality of life, not crisis response. All

too often spending is presented to the public as
an urgent response to crisis or in terms of individual economic self-interest. The
experience of other jurisdictions suggests that basing public appeals on collective quality of
life may be more effective at mobilizing support for expenditure.
Workshop participants debated whether a crisis narrative is needed to spur action
on social, economic, and fiscal problems and risks. Some argued, for example, that a crisis
narrative is necessary to mobilize public support for extreme weather event readiness. The
problem is that not all issues are reducible to crisis, and the impacts of crises are not evenly
distributed across society. People who are most at risk—such as the poor, the elderly, recent
immigrants—may have the least voice. Crisis narratives may also favour a reactive rather
than proactive posture. Acting only in times of crisis, such as economic recession, disease
outbreak, or infrastructure failure, may lead to spending that is non-strategic, is sporadic
rather than consistent, and does not increase positive spin-off effects. The Toronto region
has also seen appeals to individual utilitarian self-interest—for example, CivicAction’s
“what would you do with 32?” campaign. Again, the impacts of diffuse problems such as
high congestion-induced commute times fall unevenly across society. Those with the
greatest resources and voice may have the least to gain.
An alternative approach is to make a broad appeal to enhanced quality of life. The
advantage of a quality-of-life framing is its potential to bridge social, economic, and
environmental domains and highlight the interconnectedness of risks and vulnerabilities.
Andrew Pietriwicz identified quality of life with the reliability of infrastructure and
services, suggesting that this may be a fruitful way of building support for redundant
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systems. Matthias Sweet framed the economic costs of Toronto’s current transportation
congestion problems in quality-of-life terms: “If you live in Mississauga and you work in
Toronto and there’s no transit, you’re just going to sit in traffic and you’re going to hate
your life. In order to compensate somebody for hating life you’re going to have to increase
their wages over the long-term. So quality of life issues are economic issues because it has
to do with the price of labour.”
Vancouver’s experience is instructive. In the early 1970s, regional planning was on
shaky footing. The old technical methods of land-use and infrastructure planning, which
narrowly focused on efficiency criteria, had lost legitimacy. Much as in the former City of
Toronto in the same period, reform candidates captured city council on a program of
improving quality of life by stopping highway construction and slum clearance projects.
Reflecting this ethos at the regional scale, the Greater Vancouver Regional District
(GVRD) embarked on an unprecedented “Urban Futures” survey that reached thousands
of residents. The result was a reframing of social, economic, and environmental issues in
relation to a “livability” narrative that laid the foundation for positive actions rather than
stopping negative ones. Broad-based public engagement was repeated when successor
regional plans were developed in the late 1980s–early 1990s and late-2000s. The adoption
of mass outreach and inclusive processes have been credited with generating broad public
support for the GVRD’s planning policies, while also bringing organized interests on-side
(see Cameron and Simon 2014; Harcourt, Cameron, and Rossiter 2007). Similar mass
engagement exercises have occurred in some American regions, including Portland,
Oregon, and Salt Lake City, Utah (Fregonese and Gabbe 2011; Hopkins and Zapata 2007).
These exercises have several characteristics in common. First, the objective of
Vancouver’s regional planning processes was to maintain and increase quality of life.
Second, each used contrasting long-term scenarios to frame collective discussion and
mobilize support for action. Scenarios incorporated variables across domains, highlighting
the intersection of economic, social, and environmental risks and vulnerabilities. Such an
approach is compatible with the exploratory scenario planning technique described in
Part 1. Evidence-based scenarios can be used not only to identify negative impacts and
positive returns in order to target investments, but also to increase stakeholder and public
knowledge and mobilize public support around solutions.
Despite having developed an elaborate system of institutionalized consultation
with the public and organized stakeholders in relation to discrete plans, policies, and
projects, Ontario has not engaged in direct civic engagement at the regional scale.
In exploring the unwillingness of governments to borrow or
increase taxes, Matti Siemiatycki suggested that a generalized lack of understanding of fiscal
concepts exacerbates public finance constraints. One way out is for leaders to make a firm
distinction between investment and spending. Good investments create assets that generate
returns and value. “Spending,” by contrast, is ephemeral. Siemiatycki also argued that the

Making the case for investment.
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public must also understand the distinction between funding by governments and financing
by lenders. Borrowing to amortize upfront costs creates an incentive to ensure that
investments are productive. These distinctions can be clarified to the public by making a
distinction between capital and operating expenditure. Municipalities already do this,
although this is not widely understood by the public. (Municipal operating budgets must
be balanced every year; the capital budget may be funded by debt.) The federal and
provincial governments, however, combine the two. It would be easier to make the
distinction between ephemeral spending and the creation of durable assets if they are
separately accounted for. While this concept has been criticized in some quarters (see
Dachis and Robson 2014), keeping two sets of books could make it easier for the province
to make the case for investing in productive infrastructure assets without being
undermined by accusations of wasteful spending.
Workshop participants also emphasized the importance of transparent analysis of
proposed investments. Siemiatycki stressed the importance of being able to assess and
prioritize infrastructure projects according to the benefits they will deliver. Distinguishing
between investment and spending on the level of rhetoric accomplishes nothing: “investing
in unproductive infrastructure projects is still wasteful spending. You need to put money
into the right projects.” In other countries including New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, infrastructure proposals are evaluated and funding is allocated on the basis of
their business case—an assessment of how the economic and social benefits and
incremental revenues balance against the costs over the lifetime of the project. This
informs the question of whether public and private investments can be paid back through
incremental revenues within a reasonable amount of time (i.e., the amortization period of
debt incurred or a P3 concession). As in the United Kingdom, business cases can also be
used as a means of prioritizing investments within a competitive funding environment.
A transparent business case approach for infrastructure or urban development
projects may reveal the inefficiency of current practices and create incentives to think in
terms of productive investment rather than spending. Frank Clayton decried the narrow
way in which City of Toronto staff reports communicate the fiscal impact of decisions. A
report on a major development application may state “no fiscal impact,” even though it
may induce substantial property tax revenues. A recent controversial study by City of
Calgary staff concluded that new suburban divisions would not “turn a profit”—that is,
generate sufficient incremental property tax revenue to offset up-front public infrastructure
expenditures—for eleven years (Markusoff 2014). Without context the public cannot assess
whether this is a reasonable time lag or a symptom of inefficient development patterns.
A potential downside of the business case approach is that governments seeking to
delay investment may use requests for refinements to the evidence base as a stalling
mechanism. Hilary Holden recounted that there is a transparency gap in the UK because
business cases prepared by proponents for central government funding are not necessarily
made public. Business cases are prepared by civil servants to inform decision makers but
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ultimately investment decisions are political. A further dilemma is how to incorporate nonfiscal benefits into the business case. As Matthias Sweet put it, prioritizing the fiscal return
on investment leads to different decisions than if the goal is to improve mobility as a social
good. The general message, however, was clear: the public decision to invest must in some
way be tied to the fiscal, social, economic, and environmental performance—which may
be construed as resilience—of the proposed asset. Transparent disclosure of potential
returns will not only facilitate prioritization of interventions; it will also help communicate
their importance to a skeptical public.

Conclusion
This paper applies a resilience lens to evaluate the Toronto region’s assets and
vulnerabilities, and draws lessons of use to municipal and provincial policymakers as they
review and amend the provincial and municipal framework for land-use planning and
infrastructure investment. It also endeavours to connect land-use and infrastructure
questions to other policy domains in relation to recognized risks and sources of
uncertainty. To do so, we synthesized insights on the Toronto region from a diverse range
of professionals and published literature, and also from academic and other published works
on resilience. The objective was neither to engage in speculative futurism nor to argue, like
Chicken Little, that the sky is falling. Rather, the result of this project is a sometimes
provocative reflection on the region’s assets, vulnerabilities, and challenges; an investigation
into potential gaps in policy content and process; and a window on alternative ways of
viewing generally accepted problems.
The workshop participants agreed that decisions made today have potentially longterm effects, and so we must accept uncertainty, manage risks, and be prepared to adapt.
Juan Gomez remarked that “we really do need to get our fundamentals right because we
can’t predict.” To reiterate Toby Lennox’s remark cited earlier, “We didn’t know what
would happen in 50 or 100 years. The one thing we did know is that if we didn’t get the
first 20 years right, the next 20 years wouldn’t really matter.” In this vein, Andrew
Pietrewicz invoked U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who once said “plans are
worthless; planning is everything.” Pietrewicz summed up the challenge of anticipatory
governance: “we will never know what the future needs are, so it’s a matter of maintaining
options. The planning has to be routinely revisited so that we’re better able to change
along the way.”
Incorporating the potential for adaptation to social, economic, and environmental
change into planning processes is a precondition of resilience. This is true at the scale of
the building, the parcel, the neighbourhood, the municipality, and the region. Redundancy
and diversity enable adaptation. Faisal Moola used the example of a keystone species,
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without which an ecosystem collapses. Having other options, or redundant capacities,
enables the system to continue to function under stress.
Finally, much discussion concerned the current political impasse regarding how
best to finance and expand overdue hard and soft infrastructure of all kinds. The discussion
pointed toward the need for a new public narrative, one that portrays wise capital spending
as an investment, and links it to quality of life improvements. Much depends on leaders’
ability to communicate the need for social and economic investment. As George
McCarthy, the president of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, recently remarked: “We
have to … rebuild the understanding in the general population of the role of local
government and why it is necessary and good to pay taxes, or otherwise the provision of
public goods would not happen” (Kredell 2015). Without renewed investment, the
Toronto region’s vulnerabilities may eclipse its considerable assets, undermining its
resilience to economic, social, and environmental risks.
Note to the reader
After this paper was completed the provincial government released proposed revisions to the
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, the Greenbelt Plan, the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Plan, and the Niagara Escarpment Plan. These proposed documents, which are
available from the government’s Places to Grow website, contain a number of changes that align
with some of the ideas presented in this paper. These include:
• When planning new or expanded infrastructure systems, municipalities would be required to
undertake long-term scenario-based evaluation of the financial viability of assets over their
complete life cycle. Also, settlement area expansions would only be permitted if supported by a
viable financing plan for infrastructure and public service facilities (including education, social
services, health care, and protective services that receive government funding).
• Master planning for water and wastewater infrastructure would take into account climate change
impacts, including forecast changes to precipitation volume and intensity.
• Municipalities would be required to undertake, with public and private partners, integrated
planning for public service facilities, including the co-location of schools with other community
functions in “hubs.” In the proposed plans, public service facilities are discussed as integral to
complete communities.
• Municipalities would be expected to plan to achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions and
mitigate climate change impacts in part through urban and rural land-use and infrastructure
planning.
These and other changes, and the degree to which the revisions integrate policy objectives across
domains, are encouraging developments. Still, much hinges on implementation. The proposed
plans place new substantive requirements and procedural burdens on municipalities. As the plans’
objectives cannot be realized without the support of local government leaders, private-sector
stakeholders, and the public, the provincial government must take care to explain the long-term
benefits of its policies and cultivate broad support.
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Appendix: Workshop process and participants
Four workshops were held between February 17 and 20, 2015, with between five and
eight participants in each. Participants were recruited on the basis of their expertise so that
each group represented a broad range of professions and knowledge bases. We specifically
sought “doers”—experienced people directly engaged in professional practice rather than
the leaders of organizations. We also sought geographic representation from different parts
of the Toronto region. Each workshop was three hours long. The project leaders facilitated
the discussion by posing questions, but allowed it to unfold organically. The discussions
were recorded and transcribed by research assistants affiliated with the University of
Toronto’s Program in Planning. With the assistance of project partner the Urban Land
Institute, the workshops were hosted by the national interdisciplinary planning and design
consultancy DIALOG. ULI–Toronto’s Executive Director and DIALOG staff with
relevant expertise were invited to participate in the discussions. Participants’ affiliations are
listed as they were at the time of the workshops and, if changed, as they were at the time of
publication. Previous affiliations are also indicated where relevant.
Fiscal Resilience Workshop – Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Lloyd Cherniak, Vice President, Lebovic Enterprises
Frank Clayton, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research and Land
Development, Ryerson University
Hilary Holden, then Head of Transportation Consulting in Canada, Arup; now Director,
Transit and Sustainable Transportation, City of Toronto
Richard Joy, Executive Director, ULI Toronto
Matti Siemiatycki, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Program in Planning
Robert Hatton, Director, Strategic Initiatives & Intergovernmental Finance, City of
Toronto was unable to attend the workshop and was interviewed separately
Environmental Resilience Workshop – Wednesday, February 18, 2015
Aderonke Akande, Project Manager, Tower and Neighbourhood Revitalization, City of
Toronto
Craig Applegath, Principal, DIALOG
Cherise Burda, then Regional Director, Ontario, Pembina Institute; now Director, City
Building Institute, Ryerson University
Richard Joy, Executive Director, ULI Toronto
Faisal Moola, Director General, Ontario and Northern Canada, David Suzuki Foundation
Andrew Pietrewicz, Director, Resource Integration, Power System Planning at
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO)
Brenda Webster, Architecture and Urban Design Consultant
Yvonne Yeung, Senior Planner, Urban Design, City of Markham
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Economic Resilience Workshop – Thursday, February 19, 2015
Damian Dupuy, Manager, Strategic Policy Coordination, Ministry of Economic
Development, Employment, and Infrastructure, Government of Ontario
Juan Gomez, then Vice-President, Government Relations and Policy (Acting), Toronto
Region Board of Trade; now Senior Partner, Policy and Public Affairs, ThinkTank
Toronto
Toby Lennox, consultant; formerly Vice President of Strategy Development and
Stakeholder Relations at the Greater Toronto Airports Authority
Tom Smith CRX MCIP RPP, Senior Vice President, Development and Leasing,
SmartCentres Inc.
Martin Sparrow, Principal, DIALOG
Matthias Sweet, then Postdoctoral Fellow, McMaster Institute for Transportation and
Logistics, now Assistant Professor, School of Urban and Regional Planning, Ryerson
University
Peter Thoma, Partner, urbanMetrics
Social Resilience Workshop – Friday, February 20, 2015
Will Dunning, President, Will Dunning Inc., Economic Research
Renée Gomes, Director, Development, Waterfront Toronto
Richard Matern, Senior Manager of Research, Daily Bread Food Bank
Diego Morettin, Principal, DIALOG
Dennis Raphael, Professor of Health Policy and Management, York University
Samir Sinha, Director of Geriatrics, Mount Sinai and the University Health Network
Hospitals and Provincial Lead, Ontario’s Seniors Strategy
Jocelyn Strutt, Project Manager, Neighbourhood Action Strategy, City of Hamilton
Shahil Thomas, then Local Economies Developer, Metcalf Foundation; now Manager,
Toronto Enterprise Fund, United Way of Greater Toronto
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